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ABSTRACT
China’s rapid economic growth and social transitions have drawn substantial recent atten-
tion. However, there is still limited understanding of these phenomena and the mechanisms
behind them. This dissertation investigates three aspects of China’s development: educa-
tion, female labor supply and responses to natural shocks.
Chapter 1 sheds light on the option value of education by studying the impact of China’s
college enrollment expansion on educational attainment at the high school level. Standard
human capital models without uncertainty rarely address the importance of the option value
of education – the opportunity that a certain level of education provides to obtain a higher
level of education. Therefore, changes in option values can affect human capital investment
decisions. Combining survey data with provincial statistics and applying a difference-
in -differences method, I find that China’s college expansion significantly increased the
probabilities of enrolling in and completing high school. The probability of completing
high school increased more than that of enrolling in high school. Female students benefited
more, as did children whose mother had a high school degree.
Chapter 2 studies the relationship between fertility and female labor supply. Many
empirical studies find a negative correlation between the two, however the evidence on
causal effects is weaker because fertility is endogenous. This paper studies the effects of
childbearing on women’s labor supply and earnings using a plausibly exogenous change,
the relaxation of China’s One Child Policy, as an instrument for family size. The main
findings are that total fertility has no significant impact on time of working as a wage
earner, but children under six have a negative effect. Neither total fertility nor children
v
under six affect women’s farming time or annual income.
Chapter 3 explores the long-term consequences of China’s Great Famine from 1959
to 1961. Several studies have investigated the causes of the famine, yet little empirical
work examined its consequences. This paper examines a set of health and socioeconomic
outcomes that have not been studied. I find a significant positive selection in the height
of survivors born during the famine. Individuals born during the famine received less
education than those born before or after the famine, were more likely to work in agriculture
when starting to work and transferred less money to their parents.
vi
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Chapter 1
College Expansion and Educational Attainment:
A Study in China
1.1 Introduction
Standard human capital investment models suggest that educational attainment is deter-
mined to maximize the net expected value of life-time earnings and assume returns to
schooling to be deterministic. Previous studies within this framework usually did not con-
sider the existence of the option value that adds uncertainty to returns to schooling. For
example, people must finish high school before going to college. Therefore the value of high
school education should include not only future earnings of a high school graduate, but also
the possibility of obtaining a college degree and corresponding income. This paper reveals
the importance of this option value in human capital investment by studying the impact of
China’s college enrollment expansion on educational attainment at the high school level. It
finds that increasing the supply of higher education leads to higher educational attainment
at lower levels. This outcome clearly differs from the prediction of the standard human
capital model without uncertainty that a change to access to education will only affect
educational attainment at the same level.
College enrollment used to be low in China. In 1990s only 20-30% of students applying
for college could be admitted. In 1999, China started to expand college enrollments on
a massive scale and the overall enrollment rate grew rapidly to over 70% by 2010. This
increase in opportunities for higher education raised the option value of pre-college educa-
2tion, especially at the high school level which determines one’s chance to get enrolled in
college, and therefore should have resulted in higher educational attainment at the high
school level.
This paper combines individual-level data from the Chinese General Social Survey
(CGSS) with province-level data from China and applies a difference-in-differences method.
The general expansion rules claimed that the scale of college expansion depended on ini-
tial college availability: places with lower college availability were highly expanded. I
use the initial number of colleges in a province divided by its population to denote the
pre-expansion college availability. Individuals are divided into two cohorts by age at the
expansion. The old cohort was not exposed to the expansion and the young cohort was.
The difference between high expansion and low expansion regions of the difference between
old and young cohorts captures the expansionary effects.
The baseline regressions show that the college expansion significantly increased the
probability of obtaining high school education. Estimates by stage and on subgroups show
that the probability of completing high school increased more than that of enrolling in
high school, which can be naturally predicted since students had more outside options
before entering high school than after. Females benefited more than males, suggesting that
households tended not to “waste resources” on girls if chances to go to college were small.
The effect of the expansion did not depend on parental education except when the father
had a college degree or the mother had a high school degree. These findings are robust
to alternative specifications with different measures of expansion intensity and additional
control variables.
The underlying assumption of this diff-in-diff method is that the expansion was exoge-
nous and no other simultaneous trends had caused the educational attainment to increase,
for which I present evidence in various aspects. I do a placebo test of exogeneity and
the results suggest no preexisting trend that could have driven the educational attainment
higher. I investigate the relationship between high school development and college expan-
sion and find no evidence of correlation between the two. After controlling for high school
3trends, my main results still hold. I also estimate high school wage premium and college
wage premium utilizing a supplemental data set, and add the estimated premiums to the
baseline models to test any impact from the labor market. I find similar results as before,
and therefore can reject the hypothesis that the increase in educational attainment was
caused by labor market factors.
The existing literature on educational attainment can be mainly attributed to two
debating theories: human capital theory and signaling theory. This paper follows the
former and extends it by adding uncertainty to the value of education. The pure human
capital model without uncertainty would predict an impact of a policy only on the level
of education directly affected. Thus there would be a higher college attendance after the
college expansion but no difference at the high school level. On the other hand, signaling
models may predict an impact on the levels of education not directly affected by the policy
but the effects may go in an opposite direction. Bedard (2001) studied the relationship
between university availability and completion of high school using a signaling model and
found that more access to universities led to higher high school dropout rates. With low
university availability, low-ability students would finish high school to signal themselves as
high-ability ones who were constrained from entering university. This signaling procedure
failed to work where universities were more available and thus low-ability students would
drop out. An earlier paper by Lang and Kropp (1986) rejected the human capital model
against the signaling model by revealing the positive effect of compulsory attendance law
on the educational attainment of individuals who were not directly affected by the law.
However, in both studies returns to schooling are deterministic. Taking option values into
account may alter the predictions of the signaling models as well.
This paper is also related to studies on supply of education. A number of papers showed
that removing the supply side constraints led to higher educational attainment, but mostly
focused on primary schools and captured the effect at the same level of education.1 From
1Birdsall’s study in Brazil (1985) and Handa’s study in Mozambique (2002) provided evidence that
enrollment rates of primary school were higher where more primary schools were available. Duflo (2001)
examined the primary school construction program in Indonesia and showed that building more primary
4a policy perspective, higher education expansion pushed by the government is not unique
to China. Expansions in other countries such as Russia and Korea have also been explored
(Kyui 2012; Park and Son 2013). Both studies used college expansion as an instrument
to estimate returns to schooling. Most studies on China’s higher education expansion
focused on attainment of collegiate education and its labor market consequences. Li and
Xing (2010) found that higher education expansion increased the probability of going to
college and decreased the within-sector inequality of the population with more than a high
school education. They also found an increase in the income level of high school graduates
and a slight and not significant decrease in that of the college graduates. Li et al. (2013)
showed that while the expansion increased the probability of going to college, it also sharply
increased the unemployment rate for college graduates. In contrast to all these studies,
this paper looks at the education market consequences of the expansion and examines the
effects at a pre-college level instead of at the college level.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 states the institutional background of
this study; Section 3 describes data and sample; Section 4 exhibits empirical specification
and estimation results; Section 5 further discusses research methods and results; Section 6
concludes the paper.
1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 China’s Educational System and College Enrollment
The educational system in China is composed of three stages: primary, secondary and
post-secondary. Primary education usually involves five or six years of primary school.
Secondary education consists of two parts: junior secondary education, which is usually
three or four years of junior middle school; and senior secondary, which includes different
types of schools besides the three-year academic high schools, such as technical schools, vo-
cational schools or other specialized schools. Post-secondary education, or higher education
schools significantly increased years of education.
5as it is usually called, includes three to five years of college or university education.
The nine-year compulsory education involves primary and junior secondary education.
Beyond that students can choose freely whether to continue to senior secondary and higher
education. Obtaining senior secondary education is usually easy because of the high avail-
ability and low selectivity of secondary schools, while promotion to higher education is
much more difficult due to the screening process that determines college admission, the
National College Entrance Examination (NCEE).
College entrance examinations emerged in China with the establishment of modern uni-
versities in the early 20th century. The nationally-unified examination started in 1952 after
the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. After a few years of enhancement,
it was eventually set as a basic part of the educational system in 1959. However, in the
following decades the examination system was seriously disturbed by political movements
and did not serve as a fundamental policy. Admission decisions were based on the political
and family background of the candidates rather than their academic achievements. The
examination was even canceled during the Great Cultural Revolution between 1966 and
1976 when all the normal activities of universities were also stalled. NCEE was officially
resumed in late 1977 after the Great Cultural Revolution ended, and has continued to be a
prerequisite for entrance to almost all higher education institutions at the undergraduate
level.2
Although the contents of NCEE vary across the country,3 the examination is adminis-
tered uniformly within each province-level district. Grading is centralized at the provincial
administrations and college enrollments are based on a province level. The total score in
NCEE is the only criterion for admission to college for the majority of students. Due to
2Although exceptions exist that some students are exempted from the exam and admitted to college
through recommendations “due to exceptional or special talent,” the proportion of such cases is very
small. For instance, in 2008 there were 9.99 million people who took the exam among whom only 13,500
(approximately 0.13%) were admitted with exemptions.
3Three subjects are mandatory everywhere: Chinese, Mathematics, and a foreign language - usually
English but may be Japanese, Russian or French. Six selective subjects in two categories (Science or
Humanities) are chosen at the discretion of the provincial administrations. Students should first choose
one category (or both as requested by provincial rules) and then take exams in the subjects in the selected
category along with the mandatory three.
6the high competitiveness of the examination, concentrated coursework and special training
are necessary for students to obtain high scores, which only academic high schools can
provide.4 In that sense, academic high school education is almost a prerequisite for higher
education.
1.2.2 College Expansion
In the first few years after the resumption of NCEE, college entrance was highly restricted.
The enrollment rate (the ratio of the number of students admitted into colleges to the
number of students participating in NCEE) was as low as 4.8%. It then rose at a steady
speed of around 8.5% per year but still stayed at a low level (less than 40%) until the late
1990s.
In November 1998, Min Tang, an economist at the Asian Development Bank, submitted
a proposal to China’s central government to expand higher education His main arguments
were that: (1) the share of college graduates in the whole population was much lower than
that of other developing countries; (2) the massive lay-offs of state-owned enterprises would
possibly cause fierce competition with young workers; (3) the great demand for higher ed-
ucation could stimulate domestic consumption and help reach the goal of an 8% annual
economic growth; (4) the colleges still had enough capacity for more students; and (5) the
universalization of higher education was of great importance to the nation. Tang’s proposal
was considered as the direct trigger of the college enrollment expansion. In 1999 the Min-
istry of Education published the “Plan for Development of Education in the 21st Century”
(Mianxiang 21 Shiji Jiaoyu Zhenxing Xingdong Jihua) and officially started the expansion.
It was claimed that the goal of the expansion was “to stimulate domestic demand, increase
consumption, boost economic growth and alleviate unemployment pressure.” The overall
college enrollment rate immediately increased to 56% in 1999 and kept growing. The en-
rollment rate reached 75% in 2013. Figure 1.1 shows the national trend of the expansion,
4Other types of senior secondary schools all focused on vocational training and rarely provide well-
organized academic courses.
7including the numbers of exam-takers, actual college enrollments and enrollment rates from
1980 to 2008.
The expansion took place in two dimensions: increasing enrollments for already-existing
colleges and increasing the number of colleges. In the former aspect, decisions on enroll-
ments are jointly made by colleges and local governments. The standard procedure is as
follows: in each year colleges submit plans for enrollment to local governments based on
their capacity and funding; local governments examine these plans and confirm the actual
conditions of colleges, and then either approve or modify the plans; after the NCEE results
become available colleges admit students following the fixed plans. Enrollment plans are
usually strictly implemented, although a small proportion of flexible seats can allocated at
the discretion of colleges themselves. In the latter aspect of the expansion, local govern-
ments determine what type of colleges and how many of them are established according to
the rules made by the central government.
Although enrollments are generally determined on a case-by-case basis, there are some
general principles applied. First, regions with a deficiency in educational resources are
favored. As part of the “Development of Western Region” project, colleges are required
to keep a certain proportion of seats for students from the eleven less developed provinces
categorized as the “western region.” Also, some other provinces which have fewer schools
at every level also enjoy similar preferential policies. Colleges have enforced the implemen-
tation of these policies because it largely determines future funding and other interests from
the governments. Second, local governments are requested to focus on expanding vocational
education, which is the lowest tier of higher education. Most of the newly-established col-
leges are two-to-three-year junior colleges that provide professional job training. These
schools mainly enroll local students who do not rank high enough to get into an academic
four-year college.
These two principles ensure that regions with fewer colleges before the expansion were
expanded more, by having more students enrolled in colleges all over the country and having
more space for establishing new colleges. Figure 1.2 presents evidence on these patterns of
8the expansion. The number of colleges divided by population in 1998 indicates the initial
college availability of each province. Figure A plots the growth rate of college enrollment
from 1998 to 2008 against the number of colleges per million population in 1998 and
Figure B plots the percentage change of number of colleges per million population during
this period. The estimated coefficients of the linear regressions are both significant at a 1%
level, showing strong negative correlation between expansion intensity and initial college
availability. These facts serve as the basis of the identification strategy in the empirical
studies.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Data Source
I combine individual-level data with province-level data for the purpose of this study.
The individual-level data used to get our main results come from the Chinese General
Social Survey (CGSS), an ongoing biennial survey of China’s urban and rural households.
Four waves are currently available from 2003 to 2008 (2003, 2005, 2006 and 2008). The
surveys covered 2,801 county-level units in 29 province-level districts (21 provinces, 4 au-
tonomous regions, and 4 directly-controlled municipalities) and 32, 417 households were
surveyed in total. In addition to basic individual and household characteristics, each survey
contained the education and occupation history of the respondents. I also exploit another
data set as additional evidence, the China Household Nutrition Survey (CHNS), which will
be described in detail later in the discussion section.
The province-level data were extracted from various Statistical Yearbooks of China. I
mainly use statistics on colleges and high schools.
1.3.2 Sample
Since the last available wave of CGSS is 2008, I focus on a period between 1990 and 2008
to be consistent with it. Years earlier than 1990 are dropped to minimize the impact of
9systematic changes during the transition period.
To investigate the effect on educational attainment at high school level, the sample
should include individuals who had not reached the high school start age in 1990, and
should have finished high school when surveyed. The primary school starting age varies
between 6 and 7 years old across the country. Thus students should have reached 15 or
16 years old when they graduate from junior high school. My sample therefore includes
individuals born after 1975 (inclusive, thus 15 years old or younger in 1990) and who had
completed, or should have completed high school if they had not dropped out, at the survey.
Another key variable is the type of place where people were educated. Since neither
birth place nor place of education was observed, I utilize information on migration history
and hukou5 locations to determine migration status and include in the sample only those
who were not immigrants in their adulthood.6 After excluding immigrants, I use current
place of residence as place of education. One directly-controlled municipality (Chongqing)
established in 1997 is dropped from the sample due to lack of comparability.
Table 1.1 summarizes the whole sample. As most of the variables in the empirical
studies are binary or categorical variables, the summary statistics display percentage within
the population.
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 Identification Strategy
I apply a difference-in-differences method to identify the effects of college expansion. There
are two main underlying assumptions of this method. First, the college expansion was ex-
ogenous. Second, the increase in educational attainment was only caused by the expansion
5A hukou is a record in China’s household registration system that officially identifies a person as a
resident of an area and includes identifying information such as name, parents, spouse, and date of birth.
6To be concise, I use one’s hukou location and parental hukou locations to determine his or her immigra-
tion status. If one’s own hukou and either of the parental hukou are in the current place of residence then
he or she is not an immigrant, otherwise the individual is an immigrant. Whenever additional information
is available such as times of hukou change or time of moving to the current place of residence, I can identify
immigrants more precisely.
10
but not any other simultaneous changes, such as increased spending on high school or
increased high school earnings. Evidence on these will be presented later.
The date of birth and place of education jointly determine an individual’s exposure to
the expansion. Since we are mostly interested in high school attainment, individuals who
had not reached the age of starting high school when the expansion began are considered as
being exposed to the policy, i.e. the treatment group. Referred to as “young cohort” in the
regressions, the treatment group include individuals born in or after 1984 (thus 15 years
old or younger in 1999). Accordingly individuals born between 1975 and 1983 constitute
the control group, or the “old cohort.”
The expansion intensity in one’s place of education is determined by initial college
availability, which is indicated by the number of colleges per million population in 1998.
There are two ways of measuring the expansion intensity: the continuous measure and the
dichotomous measure. The continuous measure is just the above number. The dichotomous
measure is constructed by the mean (or median) of this number: provinces below the mean
(or median) are defined as high expansion regions.
I start with the dichotomous measure to illustrate the identification strategy and keep
it in the baseline regressions. However, as suggested by Figure 1.2 the continuous measure
may better represent the patterns of the expansion. Thus for the rest of the empirical
analyses I keep with the continuous measure.
Before going to the empirical results, I first examine the patterns of college expansion
using the dichotomous measure of expansion (I use the mean measure throughout this
section). Figure 1.3 plots average college enrollments and average number of colleges
per million population from 1990 to 2008 for high expansion and low expansion regions
separately. It clearly shows a catchup effect of high expansion regions in college enrollment
and college availability, therefore reassuring the validity of my identification strategy.
Table 1.2 is an illustration of the identification strategy with the sample. I compare pro-
portions of individuals with different educational levels between cohorts and the two types
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of regions.7 As is shown, high expansion regions exhibit a larger increase in attainment of
high school education: probability of enrolling in high school in high expansion regions is
increased by 4.6% more than in low expansion regions, and probability of completing high
school is increased by 6.8% more.
Figure 1.4 illustrates in particular the high school enrollment and completion rates
in a similar way to Figure 1.3. Each point in the top graph indicates the proportion of
high school enrollees in the population born in a specific year in high expansion or low
expansion regions, and the bottom graph depicts the proportions of high school graduates
within birth-expansion groups. Both rates grew faster in high expansion regions after
1999. It conforms with my prediction that individuals high expansion regions attained
more education at the high school level.
1.4.2 Baseline Specification
1.4.2.1 Difference-in-differences approach
The baseline regression with the continuous measure of expansion intensity takes the fol-
lowing form:
yijk = β0 + β1Y oungijk + β2College1998,j
+β3Y oungijk × College1998,j (1.1)
+β4Xijk + γj + wk + ijk.
Since we are interested in choice between different levels of education, not years of
education, the dependent variable yijk is an ordered choice variable categorized by three
7When calculating college attendance I only include individuals aged 20 and above to ensure that
everyone was certain about being enrolled in college or not.
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educational levels:
yijk =

0, if i stopped education before high school;
1, if i dropped out of high school;
2, if i graduated from high school.
The control variables are defined as follows. College1998,j is the number of colleges per
million population in 1998 of province j. Y oungijk is a dummy variable which equals 1
if individual i belongs to the young cohort. Xijk is a series of individual characteristics
including gender (1 for male and 0 for female), parental educational levels, type of place of
residence (1 for urban and 0 for rural) and type of hukou (1 for urban and 0 for rural). To
be consistent with the definition of the dependent variable, parental educational levels are
also defined by highest the level of education completed. Father’s or mother’s education
equals 1 if his or her highest completed educational level is primary school, 2 if junior
secondary school, 3 if senior secondary school, and 4 if higher education. 0 means lower
than primary school, which can be illiterate, semi-illiterate or dropout of primary school.
γj is a province fixed effect. wk is a fixed effect for wave k in the survey. ijk is an error
term clustered at province level.
Table 1.3 presents the estimation results from this specification. In each set of esti-
mation, I estimate both OLS and ordered-probit models as a double check for robustness.
The key parameter indicating the expansionary effect is the coefficient of the interaction
term between young cohort and the number of colleges. Since higher college availability
means lower expansion, the coefficient of the interaction term should be negative under
my hypothesis. The estimated coefficients have the predicted sign and are quite signifi-
cant in both OLS and ordered-probit regressions, showing strong evidence that the college
expansion does have an impact on educational attainment at the high school level.
Estimates of the other parameters also meet our predictions. Young cohort achieved
higher levels of education, which coincides with the trend that people get more educated
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in recent years. Individuals in places where colleges were more available had higher levels
of education, which conforms to the fact supporting my identification strategy that these
places were more developed in education. There is little evidence that gender matters in
educational attainment. Urban residents and people with urban hukou were more educated.
Parental educational levels have significantly positive effects on children’s schooling.
I also estimate a specification with the dichotomous measure:
yijk = β0 + β1Y oungijk + β2HighExpansionj
+β3Y oungijk ×HighExpansionj
+β4Xijk + γj + wk + ijk,
whereHighExpansionj is a dummy variable which equals 1 if province j is a high expansion
region, and all the other variables follow the definitions before.
Table 1.4 presents the estimation results. The first two columns use the mean of the
number of colleges per million population as the cutoff of expansion intensity, and the
last two columns use the median. The signs and significance level of the coefficients of the
interaction term coincide with the previous results, although the estimate of ordered-probit
is not quite significant when using the median measure.
1.4.2.2 Birth cohort evidence
The identification strategy can be investigated in more detail by decomposing the effect of
the expansion. Consider the following specification with interaction terms of birth cohort
and expansion intensity:
yijk = β0 + β1College1998,j + β2
∑
i
Dijk
+β3
∑
i
Dijk × College1998,j
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+β4Xijk + γj + wk + ijk,
where Dijk is a series of dummies indicating i’s birth year, and all the other variables follow
definitions above.
A testable prediction according to my identification strategy is that the parameters of
the interaction terms between birth year and expansion intensity should be around zero for
birth cohorts 1975 to 1983 who were not exposed to the expansion, and negative for birth
cohorts 1984 to 1990 who were exposed to the expansion. Figure 1.5 plots the estimated
coefficients of the interaction terms with their standard errors. The coefficients show a
consistent pattern with our prediction, which provides further evidence to the identification
strategy.
1.4.3 Additional Results
1.4.3.1 Stage-by-stage effects
The baseline regressions simply assume equal effects of college expansion for each stage to
a higher level of education. It is reasonable to believe that students at different stages were
motivated in different ways, and the effect should be estimated separately for each stage.
I estimate three equations taking the same form as equation 1.1, where the dependent
variable yijk is a dummy variable indicating: (1) whether i enrolled in high school; (2)
whether i completed high school; and (3) whether i enrolled in college. In the last set of
regressions, I only include individuals aged 20 and above who were certain about being
enrolled in college or not.
Table 1.5 shows the results of these regressions. All estimates of the three stages are
negative, so the effects are positive for each step of progress. The strong effect on college
attendance strengthens the prerequisite for my argument to be true: high expansion regions
had higher college attendance after the expansion. The significantly big effects on enrolling
in and completing high school show that people were strongly motivated to obtain high
school education. It is quite intuitive that the increase in completing high school was greater
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than the increase in enrolling in high school. High school dropouts can only be identified
as junior high school graduates in the labor market, which is a big disadvantage, and
the outside options for them are also limited. When the largely increased opportunities
of getting higher education raised the option value of staying in high school, it is quite
natural that most people would choose to stay and get a high school degree as long as
the marginal cost is low. But college opportunities may not be so attractive to students
who are deciding whether to stop before high school when they have more outside options,
either entering vocational secondary schools or entering the labor market.
1.4.3.2 Subgroup analysis
Related to the previous analysis, another interesting perspective is to look at the effects
on subgroups conditional on having finished a lower level of education because stopping
education at a certain stage prevents people from making further decisions: students who
have not finished junior high school will never be enrolled in high school, those who have
not enrolled in high school will never be able to drop out and those who have not graduated
from high school will hardly have a chance to go to college. In light of this elimination
process, I use sub-samples to test if results remain the same.
The regressions take the same form as in the previous section. The difference here is
that in each regression the sample includes observations conditional on having finished a
lower level of education, i.e. yijk is a dummy variable indicating: (1) whether i enrolled in
high school conditional on i having completed junior high school; (2) whether i completed
high school conditional on i having enrolled in high school; and (3) whether i enrolled in
college conditional on i having completed high school. Again the last set of regressions
only include individuals aged 20 and above.
Table 1.6 shows the results from these regressions. Compared to the results from the
previous section, the effects on enrolling in high school and college attendance become
smaller but remain significant. The effect on completing high school remains the same in
the OLS regression, although losing significance in the ordered-probit regression.
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1.4.3.3 Heterogeneity
It is also interesting to see how the expansion affects different groups of people differently.
Heterogeneity may exist in various aspects, and I investigate four possible sources by adding
interaction terms to the baseline regression:
yijk = β0 + β1Y oungijk + β2College1998,j
+β3Y oungijk × College1998,j
+β4Zijk + β5Zijk × Y oungijk
+β6Zijk × College1998,j
+β7Zijk × Y oungijk × College1998,j
+β8Xijk + γj + wk + ijk,
where Zijk is a variable of interest that may generate heterogeneity, including:
(a) Zijk = Male, a dummy variable which equals 1 if i is male, testing heterogeneity
in gender.
(b) Zijk = Urban resident, a dummy variable which equals 1 if i is an urban resident,
testing heterogeneity in type of place of residence.
(c) Zijk = Urban hukou, a dummy variable which equals 1 if i has an urban-registered
hukou, testing heterogeneity in type of household registration status.
(d) Zijk = Father
′s education or Mother′s education, testing heterogeneity in parental
educational levels. In each set of estimations, Father(Mother)′s education is categorized
in three ways: 1) whether Father (Mother) had completed junior secondary education
(Zijk = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 2) whether Father (Mother) had completed senior secondary
education (Zijk = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise); and 3) whether Father (Mother) had completed
higher education (Zijk = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise).
Panel A of Table 1.7 shows a significantly strong heterogeneous effect in gender. Female
students benefited more than male students, suggesting that households tended to invest
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more on boys when chances to go to college were low, and as such chances increased the
resources shifted to boys flew back to girls. Panel B does not show significant heterogeneous
effects in place of residence, neither does Panel C in household registration status.
Table 1.8 shows heterogeneous effects in parental education. Father’s education mat-
tered when he had once enrolled in college, and mother’s education mattered when she
got a high school degree. There are no clear explanations why these two effects went in
opposite directions. It may suggest that parents affect children’s schooling in different
ways.
Finally, I run a regression with interactions of all the above variables. Although not
reported here, it shows similar results as the above regressions.
1.4.4 Robustness Check
I apply an alternative specification as a robustness check using interactions between young
cohort and province dummies:
yijk = β0 + β1Y oungijk + β2
∑
j
Pj + β3
∑
j
Pj × Y oungijk
+β4Xijk + wk + ijk,
where Pj is a dummy variable of province j and all the other variables are defined as above.
Table 1.6 plots the estimated coefficients of these interaction terms against the initial
number of colleges per million population. Under my hypothesis these two variables should
be negatively correlated. Although the negative correlation between the two is small as is
shown by the linear fitted values, this is most likely due to the two outliers. All the other
estimates perform the predicted relationship quite well.
1.5 Discussion
The validity of the empirical studies depends on several key issues that need to be further
addressed. First, diff-in-diff methods are only valid when the expansion was exogenous,
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i.e. there was no preexisting trend that could have driven the effects I find in the previous
sections. Second, the expansion was truly implemented in the way that I identify expansion
intensity, i.e. lower college availability means higher expansion. Third, the increase in edu-
cational attainment was not caused by other institutional or economic transitions occurring
simultaneously with the college expansion; of which two major concerns are whether there
was also an expansion at the high school level and whether there was any labor market
change that had made high school degrees more attractive. This section further discusses
these issues.
1.5.1 Test of Exogeneity
To examine the exogeneity of the college expansion, I do a placebo test with a population
that was not exposed to the expansion. I choose a sample of individuals born after 1975
and who should have completed high school by 1998. Suppose there was a hypothetical
college expansion in 1990. Similarly to the main analysis, I construct measures of the
intensity of the hypothetical expansion using the number of colleges per million population
in 1990, choose a random year as the cutoff of young and old cohort and estimate the
baseline regressions.
Table 1.9 reports the estimation results when I use 1978 as the cutoff of cohorts. For the
dichotomous measure estimations, I only report results using the mean measure. Regres-
sions using the median measure have similar results. The estimates of the interaction term
are small and insignificant, showing little evidence of preexisting trends that had caused the
differences in educational attainment across regions. These results are robust to any choice
of the cutoff year of cohorts, or using the number of colleges per million population in any
year between 1990 and 1998 as a measure of the intensity of the hypothetical expansion.
1.5.2 Evidence on Expansion Intensity
Figure 1.2 has already shown direct evidence that places with lower college availability
had bigger increases in both college enrollment and number of colleges. The correlation
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between college enrollment and initial college availability needs to be further addressed
because the enrollment actually shows how many students were enrolled by colleges in a
certain province rather than how many students from this province were enrolled in college
either inside or outside the province. If high expansion regions did have more students
enrolled by outside colleges, we should observe that in low expansion regions, more college
enrollees were from outside after the expansion. And if high expansion regions did establish
more new colleges, it should be the case that more local residents enrolled in college in
these regions after the expansion.
The latter fact has already been proved in the previous sections (the last columns of
Table 1.5 and Table 1.6). To show the former fact, I exploit the proportion of immigrants
in the CGSS sample with a diff-in-diff method. The prediction is that the proportion of
immigrants among college enrollees should have a bigger increase in low expansion regions
after the expansion. Panel A of Table 1.10 confirms this prediction by showing that the
proportion of immigrants among college enrollees in low expansion regions increased by
11.5% more than in high expansion regions. Panel B does a similar experiment with the
population at high school level or below. The same pattern should not be observed in this
population with nothing happening at the high school level. The diff-in-diff estimate, both
small and insignificant, confirms that hypothesis.
1.5.3 Development in High School Education
The causality between college expansion and increase in high school attainment may be
questionable if there was also a high school expansion at the same time which could in-
crease high school attainment as well. To address this issue I explore the evolution of
two indicators of high school quality: average annual expenditure per student and the
student/teacher ratio.
Figure A of Figure 1.7 plots the percentage change of annual expenditure per high school
student between 1998 and 2008 against the number of colleges per million population in
1998, and Figure B plots the change in student/teacher ratio in the same period. Linear
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fitted values are also plotted. The figures do not show plausible correlation between high
school quality and college expansion. To further test the impact of high school development,
I take the levels of these two indicators in the year when an individual reached 15 years
old and add them into the baseline regressions. Table 1.11 shows the estimation results.
In both specifications, the magnitude of the expansionary effects drops a little but the
significance level remains.
1.5.4 Impact of Labor Market
Many labor market factors could have led to the increase in educational attainment at
high school level. As more people obtained higher education due to the expansion, the
supply of high school graduates decreased. Also, there could have been other labor market
transitions, for example, a boost in certain labor-intensive industries that caused a higher
demand for high school graduates. All these changes, observed or unobserved, might
have driven earnings of high school graduates higher and made high school education
more attractive. On the other hand, changes in college wage premium will also change
the option value of high school education and thus affect investment in education. The
causality between college expansion and the increase in high school attainment does not
stand unless I can exclude the possibility that the effects I find are due to labor market
feedback.
Since the CGSS starts from 2003 and does not cover the period before the expansion,
I instead use the China Household Nutrition Survey (CHNS) to conduct the study in
this section. The CHNS is a panel data set that covers nine provinces with about 4400
households and 26,000 individuals. Although the project focuses on health and nutrition
outcomes, it contains enough demographic and economic information for the purpose of
this study. The data set includes nine waves between 1989 and 2011 which I treat as nine
cross-sections in the study here.
First I examine the change in high school wage premium, by which I mean the difference
between earnings of people with or without high school degrees. I run a simple regression
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on a sample of individuals at high school level or below:
logwageijt = β0 + β1HighSchoolijt + β2HighExpansionj + β3
∑
t
T
+β4HighSchoolijt ×HighExpansionj
+β5
∑
t
HighSchoolijt × T + β6
∑
t
HighExpansionj × T
+β7
∑
t
HighSchoolijt ×HighExpansionj × T
+β8Xijt + γj + ijt,
where i denotes individual, j denotes province and t denotes survey year. The dependent
variable is the log of average monthly wage (inflated to 2011 yuan); HighSchoolijt is a
dummy variable indicating holding a high school degree or not; HighExpansionj is the
dichotomous measure of expansion intensity and the mean measure is used here; T is a
dummy variable of survey year; Xijt include individual characteristics such as age, age
squared, working years, 8working years squared, gender and place of residence; γj is a
province fixed effect; and ijt is an error term clustered at community level.
The estimated coefficients of the triple interaction terms are presented in Table 1.12
and plotted in Figure 1.8 with their standard errors. Both the magnitude and the signifi-
cance levels of these parameters are small. It is quite unlikely that the higher educational
attainment in high expansion regions was driven by higher returns to high school education.
Second I examine the change in college wage premium using a similar estimation strat-
egy, except that the sample now includes people with college degrees and the control
variable HighSchoolijt is replaced by a dummy variable Collegeijt that indicates having
a college degree or not. Table 1.13 and Figure 1.9 report the parameters of interest. The
coefficients of the triple interactions show that high expansion regions had a higher college
wage premium before the expansion and this advantage decreased sharply afterward and
8For individuals who were below the educational level of junior high school, I start counting their working
years from age 15.
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finally disappeared. This is predictable since these regions used to be deprived of a labor
force with college degrees, and the expansion led to an increase in the supply of college
graduates. The decreased college wage premium reduced the option value of high school
and may strengthen our results in return.
The above evidence is not enough to exclude the impact of the labor market. It is
possible that low expansion regions initially had a larger labor force with high school
degrees and were not affected much by the expansion, while high expansion regions had
a smaller population with high school degrees and the expansion had a greater impact on
the population in the lower half of the ability distribution. Therefore, it is necessary to
investigate the wage premiums in these two types of regions separately. I estimate the high
school and college wage premiums respectively for high and low expansion regions in the
eight years of CHNS, and combine them with the CGSS data to check the robustness of
my main findings.
The wage premiums are estimated with the following equation:
logwageijt = β0 + β1Degreeijt + β2
∑
t
T
+β3
∑
t
Degreeijt × T + β4Xijt + γj + ijt,
where the dummy variable Degreeijt denotes having a high school degree when estimating
high school wage premium, and having a college degree when estimating college wage
premium. All the other variables follow definitions above.
Ideally I should estimate the premiums for each individual province. But due to missing
data in certain years for certain provinces this is impossible, and I have to stick to the
dichotomous way of defining expansion intensity and divide the provinces into high and
low expansion regions. To have more precise estimates, I include only individuals below
the high school level (inclusive) and above the junior high school level (inclusive) when
estimating high school wage premium, and individuals below the college level (inclusive)
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and the high school level (inclusive) when estimating college wage premium. Thus the
premiums are more meaningful because they are comparing two adjacent educational levels.
The coefficients of the interaction terms indicate the wage premium for each degree in each
type of regions. Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11 plot these coefficients.
The next step is to add these estimated wage premiums into the baseline models as
additional controls. It is hard to tell when people make decisions on education, and there-
fore there is no deterministic way of how these controls should enter the equation. I apply
a simple strategy by assuming that people are backward-looking and myopic and only use
the most recently observed labor market factors when making decisions. For example,
decision-making in any year between 1993 and 1996 only utilizes the premiums in 1993,
decision-making between 1997 and 1999 only the premiums in 1997, and so on. I also as-
sume that people all make decisions on high school education at the age of 15. Under these
assumptions the premiums used as controls are the most recent ones that an individual
observed when he reached age 15. These assumptions are quite imperfect but can largely
simplify the question and the results can be generalized with more complicated setups.
As CHNS only covers 9 provinces, I tailored the CGSS data to these places. And as the
estimated wage premiums are only available from 1991, the 1975 birth cohort is dropped.
Table 1.14 presents the estimation results of the baseline regressions controlling for
high school and college wage premiums. The key parameters still have predicted signs and
remain significant. High school wage premiums did have a positive effect on educational
attainment, while college wage premiums had little effect. This test provides some evidence
that the effects I find are not caused by labor market feedback.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of China’s college enrollment expansion on educational at-
tainment at the high school level. The main finding is that the increased access to college
caused by the expansion has encouraged people to obtain more pre-college education. High
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school enrollees were motivated more than pre-high-school students. Female students ben-
efited more from the policy than male students. Parental educational levels mattered for
the expansionary effect on children’s schooling when the father had ever enrolled in college
or the mother had graduated from high school.
This study contributes to the human capital theory by emphasizing the importance the
option value of education, which is rarely discussed either in the human capital theory or
the signaling theory. It suggests future studies on human capital investment to involve this
uncertainty as part of the rationality of individuals.
Work on labor market factors is limited in this paper and should be further explored.
As to China’s higher education expansion, many more questions are worth investigating,
such as the effects on migration, labor market structures, and household behaviors other
than human capital investment, to name a few. These are all possible directions for future
studies.
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Figure 1.1: National Trend of College Expansion
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Figure 1.2: College Expansion Patterns
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Figure 1.3: Growth of College Enrollments and College Availability
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High/low expansion defined by the mean measure.
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Figure 1.4: Enrollment and Graduation Rates of High School by Birth Cohort and Expansion
Intensity
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Figure 1.5: Birth Cohort Estimation Results
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Data from CGSS.
High/low expansion defined by the mean measure.
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Figure 1.6: Alternative Specification: Province Dummies as Indicator of Expansion Inten-
sity
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Data from CGSS.
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Figure 1.7: Examination of High School Development
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Correlation coefficient: 0.498. No significance at 0.10 level.
Source: China Educational Finance Statistical Yearbooks 1999-2009
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Figure 1.8: DID Estimation Results of High School Premium
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Figure 1.9: DID Estimation Results of College Premium
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Figure 1.10: Estimates of High School Premium by Expansion Intensity
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Figure 1.11: Estimates of College Premium by Expansion Intensity
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Percentage of the population
Individual educational level
Junior high school graduate 31.1
High school dropout 13.2
High school graduate 20.0
College enrollee 22.7
Father’s educational level
Primary 38.6
Junior secondary 34.1
Senior secondary 21.6
Higher education 5.7
Mother’s educational level
Primary 56.0
Junior secondary 26.9
Senior secondary 14.6
Higher education 2.5
Male 52.2
Urban resident 63.1
Urban hukou 55.1
No. of observations 10394
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Table 1.2: Percentage of Different Educational Levels
High Expansion Low Expansion
Diff-in-Diff
Old Young Y-O Diff. Old Young Y-O Diff.
(percentage within cohort-expansion group)
Junior graduate and above 0.829 0.892 0.063 0.949 0.965 0.016 0.047
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017)
High school enrollee and above 0.485 0.604 0.119 0.689 0.762 0.073 0.046
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.026)
High school graduate and above 0.322 0.506 0.184 0.588 0.705 0.116 0.068
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025)
College enrollee and above 0.216 0.302 0.086 0.496 0.541 0.045 0.041
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.023) (0.027) (0.026)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. College enrollees are computed with samples aged 20 and above.
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Table 1.3: Results of Baseline Regression with the Continuous Measure of Expansion
Intensity
Dependent variable: categorical variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
indicating educational level OLS Ordered probit OLS Ordered probit OLS Ordered probit
Y oung × College1998 -0.0316∗∗ -0.0137 -0.0670∗∗∗ -0.0779∗∗∗ -0.0779∗∗∗ -0.0963∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0292) (0.0109) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0179)
Y oung 0.315∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗
(0.0257) (0.0378) (0.0254) (0.0400) (0.0275) (0.0451)
College1998 0.204
∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.0728∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.0487) (0.0706) (0.0217) (0.0339) (0.00505) (0.00701)
Father′s education 0.121∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.0159) (0.00982) (0.0142)
Mother′s education 0.105∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0200) (0.0123) (0.0193)
Male 0.0137 0.0172 0.0233 0.0354
(0.0192) (0.0292) (0.0203) (0.0314)
Urban resident 0.229∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.0432) (0.0616) (0.0320) (0.0488)
Urban hukou 0.392∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.0361) (0.0490) (0.0279) (0.0388)
Constant 0.686∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗
(0.0509) (0.0397) (0.0640)
Junior graduate/High school enrollee cutoff 0.246∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 1.524∗∗∗
(0.0695) (0.0655) (0.102)
High school dropout/graduate cutoff 0.592∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗
(0.0736) (0.0681) (0.0949)
Wave FE No No No No Yes Yes
Province FE No No No No Yes Yes
N 10394 10394 10394 10394 10394 10394
R2 0.057 0.214 0.236
pseudo R2 0.031 0.117 0.132
Log likelihood -9984.4 -9092.2 -8942.2
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at province level
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: Results of Baseline Regression with Dichotomous Measures of Expansion Inten-
sity
Dependent variable: categorical variable Mean measure Median measure
indicating educational level OLS Ordered probit OLS Ordered probit
Y oung ×HighExpansion 0.174∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.0969∗ 0.111
(0.0500) (0.0773) (0.0475) (0.0680)
Y oung 0.125∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.0439) (0.0676) (0.0412) (0.0594)
HighExpansion -0.401∗∗∗ -0.775∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.576∗∗∗
(0.0364) (0.0282) (0.0241) (0.0301)
Father′s education 0.117∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.00984) (0.0142) (0.00976) (0.0141)
Mother′s education 0.105∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0195) (0.0125) (0.0195)
Male 0.0224 0.0346 0.0226 0.0348
(0.0204) (0.0315) (0.0206) (0.0316)
Urban resident 0.191∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.0320) (0.0488) (0.0320) (0.0488)
Urban hukou 0.419∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.0279) (0.0388) (0.0277) (0.0385)
Constant 0.445∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗
(0.0659) (0.0658)
Junior graduate/High school enrollee cutoff 0.562∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.103)
High school dropout/graduate cutoff 0.964∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗
(0.0944) (0.0949)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10394 10394 10394 10394
R2 0.273 0.272
pseudo R2 0.115 0.115
Log likelihood -8942.1 -8944.6
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at province level
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Stage-by-stage Estimation Results
Dependent variable: dummy High School Enrollee High School Graduate College Enrollee
variable that indicates OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit
Y oung × College1998 -0.0333∗∗∗ -0.0847∗∗∗ -0.0447∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.0198∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(0.00614) (0.0166) (0.00807) (0.0267) (0.00591) (0.0285)
Y oung 0.156∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.0757∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0448) (0.0152) (0.0588) (0.0149) (0.0630)
College1998 0.0641
∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.0755∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.00256) (0.00717) (0.00280) (0.00896) (0.00214) (0.00842)
Father′s education 0.0480∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.0696∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.00517) (0.0155) (0.00562) (0.0173) (0.00579) (0.0221)
Mother′s education 0.0432∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.0617∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.00629) (0.0201) (0.00678) (0.0207) (0.00554) (0.0182)
Male 0.00845 0.0272 0.0149 0.0464 0.00727 0.0302
(0.0112) (0.0331) (0.0101) (0.0332) (0.00852) (0.0358)
Urban resident 0.113∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.0793∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ -0.0120 0.0451
(0.0184) (0.0510) (0.0154) (0.0549) (0.0147) (0.0849)
Urban hukou 0.146∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0362) (0.0172) (0.0569) (0.0165) (0.0773)
Constant 0.0545 -0.270∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(0.0339) (0.0340) (0.0216)
Cutoff 1.272∗∗∗ 2.322∗∗∗ 2.569∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.126) (0.0948)
Wave effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10394 10394 10394 10394 9506 9506
R2 0.180 0.269 0.228
pseudo R2 0.142 0.220 0.238
Log likelihood -6122.5 -5536.6 -3842.8
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at province level. College enrollees are computed with samples aged 20 and above.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Regressions on Sub-samples Conditional on Completing a Lower Level of Education
Dependent variable: dummy High School Enrollee High School Graduate College Enrollee
variable that indicates OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit
Y oung × College1998 -0.0257∗∗∗ -0.0612∗∗∗ -0.0452∗∗∗ -0.0324 -0.0303∗∗∗ -0.0853∗∗∗
(0.00541) (0.0173) (0.0145) (0.0464) (0.0108) (0.0295)
Y oung 0.142∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.0843∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0519) (0.0235) (0.0975) (0.0274) (0.0769)
College1998 0.0389
∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.0376∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ -0.00528∗ -0.0143∗
(0.00285) (0.00897) (0.00500) (0.0128) (0.00303) (0.00826)
Father′s education 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0740∗∗∗ 0.0531∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.00593) (0.0185) (0.00750) (0.0317) (0.0107) (0.0299)
Mother′s education 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0981∗∗∗
(0.00728) (0.0241) (0.00657) (0.0305) (0.0108) (0.0292)
Male -0.0126 -0.0322 0.0239∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.00439 0.0123
(0.0107) (0.0320) (0.0101) (0.0490) (0.0132) (0.0366)
Urban resident 0.0597∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.0480∗∗ 0.185∗∗ -0.0800∗ -0.226∗
(0.0141) (0.0373) (0.0190) (0.0787) (0.0393) (0.118)
Urban hukou 0.0951∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0404) (0.0261) (0.0841) (0.0256) (0.0768)
Constant 0.372∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ -1.621∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗
(0.0361) (0.108) (0.0450) (0.166) (0.0539) (0.151)
Cutoff 0.216 1.380∗∗∗ 0.335∗
(0.141) (0.159) (0.186)
Wave effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9037 9037 5809 5809 3794 3794
R2 0.135 0.325 0.122
pseudo R2 0.111 0.340 0.093
Log likelihood -5237.0 -2091.5 -2361.6
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at province level. College enrollees are computed with samples aged 20 and above.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Estimation Results of Heterogeneous Effects
Dependent variable: categorical variable OLS Ordered probit
indicating educational level
Panel A: Heterogeneity by gender
Y oung × College1998 ×Male 0.0993∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.0326) (0.0459)
R2 0.237
pseudo R2 0.119
Log likelihood -9076.9
Panel B: Heterogeneity by place of residence
Y oung × College1998 × Urban resident -0.120 -0.0788
(0.0824) (0.133)
R2 0.237
pseudo R2 0.133
Log likelihood -8934.6
Panel C: Heterogeneity by hukou status
Y oung × College1998 × Urban hukou 0.0221 0.0595
(0.0345) (0.0557)
R2 0.236
pseudo R2 0.132
Log likelihood -8939.0
N 10394 10394
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at province level. All regressions include pair-wise interactions,
other control variables as in the baseline regression, province fixed effects and wave fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Estimation Results of Heterogeneous Effects (continued)
Father’s educational level
Dependent variable: categorical variable Above junior high school Above high school Above college
indicating educational level OLS Ordered probit OLS Ordered probit OLS Ordered probit
Panel A: Father’s educational level
Y oung × College1998 × Father′s education -0.0149 -0.00163 -0.00499 -0.000600 0.0784∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.0682) (0.0985) (0.0140) (0.0264) (0.0220) (0.0400)
R2 0.231 0.233 0.231
pseudo R2 0.129 0.130 0.129
Log likelihood -8973.3 -8957.5 -8968.5
Panel B: Mother’s educational level
Y oung × College1998 ×Mother′s education -0.0386 -0.0507 -0.0612∗ -0.128∗∗ 0.0934∗∗ 0.308
(0.0282) (0.0388) (0.0312) (0.0584) (0.0399) (0.225)
R2 0.234 0.234 0.232
pseudo R2 0.130 0.131 0.130
Log likelihood -8960.5 -8950.2 -8964.9
N 10394 10394 10394 10394 10394 10394
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at province level. All regressions include pair-wise interactions, other control variables as in the baseline regression,
province fixed effects and wave fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Results of A Placebo Test
Dependent variable: categorical variable OLS Ordered probit
indicating educational level
Panel A: continuous measure of hypothetical expansion
Y oung × College1990 -0.00737 -0.00975
(0.00753) (0.0132)
Y oung 0.0642∗∗ 0.107∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0454)
College1990 0.106
∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.00551) (0.00839)
R2 0.228
pseudo R2 0.126
Log likelihood -3259.4
Panel B: dichotomous measure of hypothetical expansion
Y oung ×HighExpansion 0.0647 0.0972
(0.0487) (0.0767)
Y oung 0.00380 0.0178
(0.0408) (0.0658)
HighExpansion -0.364∗∗∗ -0.537∗∗∗
(0.0491) (0.0713)
R2 0.228
pseudo R2 0.126
Log likelihood -3259.1
N 3705 3705
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at province level. Dichotomous measure uses the mean of college1990.
Young cohort include individuals born after 1978. All regressions include control variables and fixed effects
as in the main regressions.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Diff-in-Diff Analysis of Proportion of Immigrants
High expansion Low expansion Difference
Panel A: individuals ever enrolled in college
Old cohort 0.248 0.153 0.094
(0.034) (0.018) (0.036)
Young cohort 0.195 0.216 0.020
(0.028) (0.022) (0.036)
Difference -0.052 0.063 0.115
(0.044) (0.028) (0.051)
Panel B: individuals never enrolled in college
Old cohort 0.102 0.143 -0.041
(0.005) (0.014) (0.013)
Young cohort 0.111 0.136 -0.025
(0.009) (0.021) (0.022)
Difference 0.009 -0.007 0.016
(0.010) (0.026) (0.026)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Old cohort consists of individuals born between 1970 and 1979.
Young cohorts consists of individuals born after 1980 and aged 20 or above at the last survey. Expansion
intensity is defined by mean of initial number of colleges.
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Table 1.11: Estimation Results with High School Trends
Dependent variable: categorical variable OLS Ordered probit
indicating educational level
Panel A: continuous measure of expansion intensity
Y oung × College1998 -0.0609∗∗∗ -0.0963∗∗∗
(0.0185) (0.0340)
Y oung 0.0994∗ 0.135
(0.0548) (0.0827)
College1998 0.113
∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.0189) (0.0323)
Expenditure per student 0.00636 0.0261
(0.0222) (0.0398)
Student/teacher ratio 0.0742∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0229)
R2 0.239
pseudo R2 0.139
Log likelihood -4807.7
Panel B: dichotomous measure of expansion intensity
Y oung ×HighExpansion 0.158∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗
(0.0545) (0.0875)
Y oung -0.0415 -0.0624
(0.0620) (0.0994)
HighExpansion -0.440∗∗∗ -0.600∗∗∗
(0.0739) (0.120)
Expenditure per student 0.0195 0.0415
(0.0144) (0.0253)
Student/teacher ratio 0.0398∗∗∗ 0.0565∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0165)
R2 0.236
pseudo R2 0.135
Log likelihood -6221.8
N 5841 5841
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at province level. Dichotomous measure uses the mean of college1998.
All regressions include control variables and fixed effects as in the main regressions.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.12: Estimation Results of High School Wage Premium
Dependent variable: Log(wage) Sample: individuals with high school degree or below
HighSchool ×HighExpansion× 1991 0.0534
(0.0639)
HighSchool ×HighExpansion× 1993 0.0368
(0.0712)
HighSchool ×HighExpansion× 1997 0.0347
(0.0848)
HighSchool ×HighExpansion× 2000 0.000285
(0.0760)
HighSchool ×HighExpansion× 2004 0.0551
(0.0913)
HighSchool ×HighExpansion× 2006 0.0166
(0.0928)
HighSchool ×HighExpansion× 2009 -0.00759
(0.0962)
HighSchool ×HighExpansion× 2011 0.0564
(0.0733)
Other controls Yes
N 22465
R2 0.522
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at community level. Other control variables include single and
pair-wise interaction terms of high school degree, expansion intensity and survey year, age, squared age,
experience, experience squared, gender, place of residence and province fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.13: Estimation Results of College Wage Premium
Dependent variable: Log(wage) Sample: individuals with college degree or below
College×HighExpansion× 1991 0.147∗∗
(0.0730)
College×HighExpansion× 1993 0.113
(0.0875)
College×HighExpansion× 1997 0.432∗∗∗
(0.0997)
College×HighExpansion× 2000 0.127
(0.112)
College×HighExpansion× 2004 0.000481
(0.104)
College×HighExpansion× 2006 0.131
(0.0975)
College×HighExpansion× 2009 0.0107
(0.0966)
College×HighExpansion× 2011 0.0647
(0.0923)
Other controls Yes
N 27128
R2 0.576
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at community level. Other control variables include single
and pair-wise interaction terms of college degree, expansion intensity and survey year, age,
experience, experience squared, squared age, gender, place of residence and province fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.14: Estimation Results with Constructed College and High School Wage Premiums
Dependent variable: categorical variable OLS Ordered probit
indicating educational level
Panel A: continuous measure of expansion intensity
Y oung × College1998 -0.103∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0257)
Y oung 0.342∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
(0.0385) (0.0612)
College1998 0.116
∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0258)
High school wage premium 1.062∗ 1.795∗
(0.571) (0.974)
College wage premium 0.252 0.461
(0.248) (0.397)
R2 0.254
pseudo R2 0.145
Log likelihood -3989.8
Panel B: dichotomous measure of expansion intensity
Y oung ×HighExpansion 0.342∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(0.0638) (0.0986)
Y oung -0.0686 -0.0797
(0.0722) (0.109)
HighExpansion -0.527∗∗∗ -0.834∗∗∗
(0.0617) (0.103)
High school wage premium 1.487∗∗ 2.430∗∗∗
(0.492) (0.827)
College wage premium 0.369 0.638∗
(0.244) (0.384)
R2 0.255
pseudo R2 0.145
Log likelihood -3988.0
N 4756 4756
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at province level. Dichotomous measure uses the mean of college1998.
All regressions include control variables and fixed effects as in the main regressions.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Chapter 2
Fertility and Women’s Labor Supply and Earnings
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between fertility and female labor supply is a long-standing topic of inter-
est. Theoretical work mostly adopts the life-cycle choice model which assumes that fertility
and labor supply are determined over a life cycle and predicts that having more children
will lower women’s labor supply and income (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Heckman and
Walker, 1990; Jones et al. 2008). Empirical studies also show a negative correlation be-
tween fertility and women’s labor market outcomes, but the causality of this correlation
is questionable because of the endogeneity of fertility. A commonly applied method to
address this problem is to find instruments for fertility. This paper uses a new instrument,
the relaxation of China’s One Child Policy (OCP), to study the effects of childbearing on
women’s labor supply and earnings.
China enacted the nationwide One Child Policy around 1980 to control population and
restricted households to have a single child with few exceptions. Due to widespread forced
abortions and infanticide in the early period, a relaxation was introduced into rural areas
in 1984 which allowed households to have a second child if the first one was a girl. This
exogenous shock to family size inspires the construction of the instruments for fertility in
this study. I use gender of the first child and length of exposure to relaxation as instruments
for childbearing to study the effects of having a second child on women’s labor supply and
earnings. Using data from China Health and Nutrition Survey, I first look at the impact
of total fertility and find no evidence that in general women with more children differ from
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others in their working time or income. I then examine whether the effects of fertility only
come from small children. By applying the same instrumenting method to the number of
children under six years old, I find that having another child under six decreases women’s
time of working as wage earners, but does not affect their farming time or annual income.
To check the robustness of the results, I re-estimate the IV model with a smaller sample
where the timing of relaxation is more strictly confined. The main findings still hold
although the significance level drops from 5% to 10%.
The fundamental assumptions of the IV method that gender of the first child and
the relaxation of OCP are exogenous are justified through various tests. A difference-in-
differences analysis shows little evidence of significant differences in women’s demographic
characteristics between relaxed and non-relaxed regions. I also explore whether relaxation
was correlated with early period (1980-1984) sex ratio of babies, which indicates severity of
infanticide, and violation of the relaxation rule in relaxed areas, which suggests preferences
for more children. No correlations between relaxation and early period sex ratio or violation
of relaxation are found here. Finally I examine whether relaxation was predetermined by
local labor market features, which in turn determines female labor supply. I look at the
trends of community-level labor market outcomes by relaxation status and do not find
disparities in the trends, suggesting that relaxation is not correlated with labor market
factors.
This paper follows Qian’s (2013) usage of the relaxation of OCP to instrument child-
bearing, although she studies the quality and quantity trade-off of children’s education
while this paper focuses on labor market effects. There are other instruments applied in
the existing literature on the labor force effects of childbearing. Some studies used sibling
characteristics. Angrist and Evans (1998) use the sex composition of children to instrument
family size to estimate the effects of childbearing on parents’ labor supply and find that
having children led to a reduction in female labor supply. Bronars and Grogger (1994)
and Jacobsen et al. (1999) used twin births to estimate the economic consequences of
unplanned births, and both papers find negative effects of unplanned motherhood on labor
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force participation, poverty and welfare receipt.
Another set of IVs for fertility involves institutional transitions. Klerman (1999) and
Bloom et al. (2009) show that legalizing abortion lowers the fertility rate. Bloom et al.
(2009) use this legislation as an instrument for fertility to find that a birth reduced a
woman’s labor supply by almost two years during her reproductive life. Others instru-
mented fertility using access to contraceptive methods, which is shown to postpone first
marriage (Goldin and Katz, 2002) and first birth (Miller, 2009) and reduce births (Bailey
2006; Miller 2009). Goldin and Katz (2002) find that the diffusion of the birth control pill
among young, unmarried college graduate women led to greater representation in nontra-
ditional, professional occupations. Bailey (2006) uses changes in laws restricting women’s
age to consent to medical care to show that earlier access to the pill resulted in more la-
bor supply during women’s late twenties and early thirties. Miller (2009) suggests women
gaining access to family planning as teenagers obtained more years of schooling and were
more likely to work in the formal sector and less likely to cohabit with male partners.
Shocks to fertility are also applied as IVs in empirical works. Hotz et al. (2005) use
miscarriage to estimate the effect of teen mothers not delaying their childbearing on their
subsequent attainment, and find that the negative consequences of teenage childbearing
were smaller than previous findings and short-lived. Aguero and Marks (2011) use infertility
shocks to identify the causal effect of children on female labor force participation, and find
that the IV estimates of the causal effect was much smaller than the OLS estimates.
The instruments used in the existing literature convincingly addresses concerns about
the endogeneity of fertility in various aspects, but still have disadvantages. Sex compo-
sition only applies to households with two or more children, while the biggest impact of
childbearing may come from the first one or two children. Twin-first births can address
the shock from the second child, as is shown in Bronars and Grogger (1994) and Jacobsen
et al. (1999), but since it is a rare event, this approach is only possible with large-sized
data sets and not widely feasible. Legalizing abortion or contraceptives can generate useful
exogenous variation in fertility but may be more powerful for young women than for women
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at older ages. This paper focuses on the effects of going from one child to two children,
and the method is applicable to women at all ages.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the institutional background,
Section 2.3 describes data and sample, Section 2.4 presents the empirical strategies, Section
3.5 summarizes the results, Section 2.6 checks the robustness of the results and the validity
of IV and Section 3.6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Background
During the period of Chairman Mao’s leadership in China, infant mortality sharply declined
and life expectancy dramatically increased. Until the 1960s, the government had been
encouraging families to have as many children as possible because of Mao’s belief that
population growth empowered the country. The population grew dramatically from 540
million in 1950 to 850 million in 1970. The so-called “late, long, few” policy was introduced
in the early 1970, consisting of later childbearing, longer spacing and fewer children. The
total fertility rate (TFR) fell from 5.9 in 1970 to 2.7 in 1979, but was still not enough for
the economic reform set out by Deng Xiaoping.
In 1979 China announced the One Child Policy (OCP) which forbade second births
except under certain circumstances. The policy was actually implemented in some regions
from 1978, but not formally enforced all over the country until 1980. A quota reward
system for local officials was introduced to reinforce the policy. Meeting the quotas led
to economic reward and promotions, while not meeting them would result in punishment
or loss of opportunities for promotions. As a result, in the first few years after OCP was
formally introduced, campaigns of forced abortion and sterilization spread throughout the
country, as well as female infanticide (Greenlaugh, 1986).
Under such circumstances, the central government issued “Reports on the Family Plan-
ning Policy” (“Guan Yu Ji Hua Sheng Yu Gong Zuo De Hui Bao”), also known as “Docu-
ment 7” in 1984, which amended OCP by allowing a second child under certain conditions.
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The primary purpose of this document was to curb forced abortion and sterilization and
female infanticide. Practice of relaxation was adopted by some local governments as early
as 1982, but official permits for second children were only available after “Document 7” was
released and became widespread. The main relaxation method is called the “one-child-and-
a-half” rule: rural couples can have a second child if the first one is a girl. Implementation
of this rule varied across regions. White (1992) found that permits for second children were
spread gradually. In 1982, only 5% of rural population were granted such permits. After
“Document 7”, 10% were covered in 1984, 20% in 1985 and 50% by 1986. She also pointed
out that regions with extremely high levels of infanticide were more likely to be relaxed.1
Since the relaxation was not uniformly enforced all over the country and there is no
documentation on how the timing of relaxation was determined, a major concern is that
the relaxation may be correlated with labor market features which also affect individual
labor supply and income. Section 2.6 discusses this issue by comparing differences in
various labor market factors between communities relaxed at different times, and shows
little evidence that relaxation was correlated with local labor market performance.
2.3 Data and Sample
This study uses the China Household Nutrition Survey (CHNS). CHNS is an ongoing
project designed to examine the effects of the health, nutrition, and family planning poli-
cies and programs. It currently contains nine panels from 1989 to 2011 and covers around
4,400 households with a total of 26,000 individuals in nine provinces of China. In addition
to general household and individual characteristics, the household surveys contain infor-
mation on individuals’ labor market outcomes, including labor supply and compositions of
earnings. They also keep a record of women’s birth history so that I can monitor the order
and sex composition of children. On the community level, the data contain community
characteristics such as geographic and demographic information, as well as various sorts of
1White (1992) did not specify how this claim was supported by actual data. I do not find evidence on
this, however, as is discussed in Section 2.4.1.2.
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infrastructure and social services. The key community-level indicator of OCP is whether
there was a relaxation of a second child, and the timing of the relaxation.
Since the relaxation was only released in rural areas, I restrict my sample to married
rural women. A woman included in the sample must have already had at least one child,
i.e., observations in the years when she did not have children were dropped. And she should
not have had a second birth by 1980, hence would be restrained by the OCP. The final
sample contains 3840 women with 16351 observations in 181 communities, among which 81
were already relaxed when entering the survey, 38 were relaxed during the survey period
and 62 were still not relaxed in 2011.
The main outcomes I examine are women’s time of working and income. Time of
working involves both working as wage earners and on farm. The former type involves only
non-agricultural activities and being employed on others’ farms is included in the latter
type. These two types of working can overlap, i.e. one can both work as a wage earner and
a farmer. Women’s income is the aggregate annual income from all kinds of jobs, including
income from one’s own farm, and involves all sorts of benefits, either cash or in-kind.
However, not all outcomes are observed for all women, and the empirical analysis involves
only observations without missing values. The sample size shrinks to 7352 with time of
working as wage earners being the outcome, 8302 with farming time and 12023 with income.
I check whether the likelihood of missing outcomes is correlated with fertility by regressing
an indicator for having missing outcomes on the explanatory variables conditional on a
woman working. The likelihood of having missing values in working time (which means
both working time as wage earners and farming time are missing) is not correlated with
the total number of children or the number of small children. The likelihood of income
missing is not correlated with the number of small children either, but negatively correlated
with the total number of children. However, since neither income nor the total number of
children is of our main concern, this is not a big problem. Appendix 2.A presents these
testing results.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of the whole sample, including observations with
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missing values in the outcomes. I compare individual characteristics by the number of
children ever born and the number of children under six years old for the purpose of the
empirical studies. On average, women with two or more children were five years older
and obtained one year fewer of education than women with only one child. Labor force
participation is defined as a binary variable of currently working or not. There is little
difference in this variable between the two groups, suggesting small chances of finding
a fertility effect on overall labor force participation. Women with two or more children
worked less as wage earners and more as farmers, and earned less than women with only
one child. They were also more likely to work in agricultural sectors and less likely in
state-owned enterprises. When dividing the sample by whether having children under six,
women with small children were younger and more educated, worked less on farms and
earned less. However these are unconditional disparities and do not necessarily indicate
the causal effect of fertility on differences between the two groups.
To determine a fertility-stopping age for women, I plot rural women’s age distributions
at the first, second and last births in Figure 2.1. Since women who had not given birth to
a second child by 1980 are considered as being treated by OCP and can present systematic
differences from the non-treated ones, I look at the age distributions of two subgroups by
whether having a second birth before 1980 as well as the age distribution of the whole
population. These figures generally show that age 45 is a critical cutoff for fertility in the
sense that women over 45 are highly unlikely to give more births. To be more specific, the
99 percentiles of the distributions of ages at the first, second and last births are 40, 40 and
42. Hence at age 45 more than 99% of women had stopped childbearing.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Effects of Total Fertility
My empirical analysis begins with examining the effects of total fertility on female labor
supply and income. Based on different assumptions, I specify both OLS models and IV
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models.
2.4.1.1 OLS with fixed effects
The OLS models take fertility as exogenous and include it the estimation equations directly.
The baseline regression takes the form of
yijt = α0 + α1childrenijt +α2Xijt + γj + δt + uijt, (2.1)
where yijt is labor market outcomes of individual i in community j at time t. It is a function
of: childrenijt, the total number of children; Xijt, individual characteristics including age,
age-squared and educational years of individual i and her spouse; a community fixed effect
γj and a survey year fixed effect δt.
The key assumption here is that after controlling for individual characteristics and
all fixed effects, childrenijt should be strictly exogenous. That is, the error term should
have zero conditional mean, i.e. women with two or more children would have had the
same potential outcomes as women who had only one child. If no fixed effects are spec-
ified, α1 is only unbiased when uijt does not include omitted variables, which is unlikely
to be true because the true linear model probably contains a time trend or unobserved
community-or-individual-level characteristics. Including a survey year fixed effect δt ac-
knowledges the existence of time-specific factors that affect the outcome y. And specifying
a community fixed effect γj rather than an individual fixed effect assumes that there are
community-level factors that generate differences in y, but within each community there is
no unobserved heterogeneity across individuals correlated with included explanatory vari-
ables. Otherwise, an individual fixed effect µi should replace the community fixed effect to
ensure unbiasedness of α1. An improved specification under such an assumption takes the
following form:
yijt = α0 + α1childrenijt +α2Xijt + µi + δt + uijt, (2.2)
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where µi is an individual fixed effect and the community fixed effect is dropped due to
collinearity.
OLS specifications with fixed effects assumes that timing of childbirth is independent
of potential outcomes. If this is true, equation (2.2) gives more accurate estimates than
equation (2.1) for it controls for idiosyncratic individual features and utilizes the most
information of the panel data.
2.4.1.2 IV approach
Although OLS with individual fixed effects exploits the information of the panel data to
the maximum extent, its basic assumption may still be questionable. Even after controlling
for individual characteristics and survey year fixed effects, and eliminating heterogeneity
through individual fixed effects, fertility can still be endogenous. For example, timing of
births may be correlated with individual preferences or labor market conditions. Therefore,
using exogenous variation to instrument for fertility is still necessary. I use gender of first
child and relaxation of the OCP as instruments for fertility to explore the research question.
Before proceeding to the IV specification, I first examine the exogeneity of the instru-
ments through a few tests. Appendix 2.B presents the results of all these tests. The first
one is a difference-in-differences analysis to see if women with a first girl and could have
a second child are systematically different from those with a first girl but could not have
a second child. Table 2.9 shows the differences in observable individual characteristics be-
tween these groups and finds no evidence that the disparity between a woman whose first
child was a girl and one whose first child was a boy is not systematically different across
regions, whether relaxed or non-relaxed.
According to the initial purpose of relaxation, it was more likely to be introduced into
regions with high rates of infanticide and forced abortions, which was reflected by the sex
ratio of new births in the early period of OCP (1980-1984). Infanticide and forced abor-
tions are probably correlated with son preference, and there is reason to believe that son
preference is more severe in backward regions where labor markets are also less-developed.
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Therefore relaxation could conceivably be endogenous in the sense that it is correlated
with son preference which is correlated with labor supply. If this is true, our empirical
identifications will be problematic. I use community-level information contained in the
community surveys and the first round of survey to investigate whether relaxation was
correlated with the early period sex ratio. The following equation is estimated:
relaxtimej = β0 + β1pt malej + β2opentradej + β3roadj + β4telegraphj
+β5telephonej + β6postalj + β7newspaperj + β8electricityj (2.3)
+β9dis busj + β10dis trainj + β11enterprisej + β12farmlandj + uj ,
where relaxtimej is years of relaxation by 2011 of community j. pt malej is the per-
centage of boys among all infants born between 1980 and 1984. roadj is a categorical
variable measuring the road condition of community j, the higher the better. opentradej
measures whether the community is near an open trade area (distance < 2km). telegraphj ,
telephonej , postalj , newspaperj and electricityj are all dummy variables indicating whether
the community has such service. dis busj and dis trainj measures the distance to the near-
est bus stop and train station. enterprisej and farmlandj are dummy variables of whether
the community has local enterprises or farm land. Table 2.10 shows the results of this re-
gression. Originally we have 181 original communities, but the sample size becomes smaller
due to missing values for some communities. Although the number of dependent variables
is large relative to the small sample size, the F -test shows that the regression model is good
of fit with or without farmland. Estimates on the other control variables are statistically
insignificant except those on postal service, electricity and farmland. However, the coeffi-
cients of postal service and electricity have opposite signs and hence cannot give definite
conclusions. The significant positive coefficient of farmland may suggest something, but as
a binary variable it is not an accurate measure of how agricultural or less-developed a com-
munity is. In general the estimation results suggest little correlation between relaxation
and early period sex ratio.
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The concern that relaxation may be endogenous can also be addressed by looking at the
violation of relaxation. Areas with stronger preference over sons or larger households may
break the rules more often or could have experienced more forced abortions and infanticide
which brings about earlier relaxation. The following estimation is to see whether there are
any community-specific factors that cause more violation:
rj = β0 + β1opentradej + β2roadj + β3telegraphj + β4telephonej
+β5postalj + β6newspaperj + β7electricityj + β8dis busj (2.4)
+β9dis trainj + β10enterprisej + β11farmlandj + uj ,
where rj is the rate of violation, the proportion of women who had a second child with the
first child a boy. The left-hand side variable indicates desired fertility or son preference that
may be correlated with relaxation. The right-hand side variables reflect the development
of local labor markets which in turn determines individual labor supply. Similar to equa-
tion (2.3), equation (2.4) examines whether relaxation is endogenous with labor market
outcomes. Table 2.11 presents the results. The significant estimates of daily newspaper
service and distance to the nearest bus stop may suggest that more remote places experi-
enced more violations, while the positive sign of open trade center suggest the opposite.
Again there are missing values for some communities, but the good-of-fit of the models is
justified by F -tests.
Now that we cannot reject the hypothesis that relaxation is exogenous, we can proceed
to the IV specifications. The IV approach is equivalent to a 2SLS estimator. The first-stage
regression is the following equation:
childrenijt = β0 +
181∑
j=1
β1,jcommunityj +
181∑
j=1
β2,jgirlij × communityj
+
181∑
j=1
β3,jexposedtimeijt × communityj (2.5)
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+
181∑
j=1
β4jgirlij × exposedtimeijt × communityj
+β5Xijt + δt + ijt,
where girlij indicates whether the first child of individual i is a girl. communityj is a
binary variable denoting the community. exposedtimeijt is defined as
exposedtimeijt = max{0, [min(45, ageijt)− i′s age at relaxation]},
which measures how long i had been exposed to relaxation. It returns to years of exposure
to the relaxation before reaching age 45 for individuals in relaxed regions, and 0 for those
in non-relaxed regions. All the other variables follow the above definitions.
The second-stage regression is
yijt = α0 + α1 ̂childrenijt +α2Xijt + 181∑
j=1
α3,jcommunityj + δt + uijt, (2.6)
and ̂childrenijt is the fitted value of the first-stage regression.
The excluded instruments exploits three aspects of the problem. The first two variables
come from the nature of the relaxation policy. Gender of the first child measures whether
one is eligible for having a second child. Exposed time is a variable that captures both
the status and the timing of relaxation. The community fixed effect is also included in
the belief that some exogenous community-specific factors also determine fertility. The
exogenous assumption of IV approach requires that gender of the first child, relaxation and
the interaction terms are all exogenous. The exclusion assumption requires that gender of
the first child and relaxation have an impact on female labor supply only through their
effects on childbearing. The exclusion assumption does not apply to community fixed
effects since there is no reason to believe that all the effects of community-specific factors
work only through fertility. Hence community fixed effects are also controlled for in the
main equation. I will discuss these assumptions further in Section 2.6.
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The 2SLS does not involve individual fixed effects as OLS does for two reasons. First,
individual fixed effects are no longer needed in 2SLS. The major concern about OLS is
endogenous fertility, and including individual fixed effect addresses that problem to the
greatest extent. Since the IV approach has already addressed the endogeneity problem
with the instruments, individual fixed effects are no longer necessary. Second, including
individual fixed effects greatly decreases degree of freedom and causes a big loss in the
precision of the estimates. As long as the model is correctly specified, fewer right-hand
side variables give more precise estimates.
2.4.2 Effects of Small Children
The above specifications do not put any restrictions on mothers’ or children’s ages, which
implicitly assumes the same size of impact of children at different ages. It is quite ques-
tionable since apart from quantities, children’s ages also matter for their mothers’ decision
making on labor supply. The existing literature mainly focuses on women of younger age
groups, for example, under 35 as in Angrist and Evans (1998), with the argument that
these women are more likely to have children at home, and thus their labor supply highly
depend on how many children they have. Things are slightly different in the context of
Chinese rural areas. Pre-school childcare is usually either unavailable or not affordable in
these areas.2 Women with children under school age are more likely to drop out of the
labor market or at least work less to take care of their children, while women with older
children do not necessarily have to do so. Hence an additional young child has a bigger
impact than an additional old child. To investigate how the ages of children affect women’s
labor supply, I specify models using number of children below six as the key explanatory
variable.
Similar to the previous specifications, the OLS model with community fixed effects
2According to China’s Census in 2000 and Educational Statistical Yearbook of 2000, there were a total
of 70 million children between 0 and 6 years old in rural areas and only 0.39 million kindergarten teachers
and staff, while in urban areas there were 32 million children within the same age range of age and 0.75
million teachers and staff.
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takes the form of
yijt = α0 + α1smallchildrenijt +α2Xijt + γj + δt + uijt, (2.7)
and OLS with individual fixed effects takes the form of
yijt = α0 + α1smallchildrenijt +α2Xijt + µi + δt + uijt, (2.8)
where all the other variables follow definitions before and smallchildrenijt is the number
of children below six years old.
The IV specification also consists of two stages, the first stage regression
smallchildrenijt = β0 +
181∑
j=1
β1,jcommunityj +
181∑
j=1
β2,jgirlij × communityj
+
181∑
j=1
β3,jexposedtimeijt × communityj (2.9)
+
181∑
j=1
β4jgirlij × exposedtimeijt × communityj
+β5Xijt + δt + ijt,
and the second stage regression
yijt = α0 + α1 ̂smallchildrenijt +α2Xijt + 181∑
j=1
α3,jcommunityj + δt + uijt. (2.10)
This is a similar estimator to the one in the previous section except that we are now
instrumenting the number of small children.
Most of the assumptions of each model in Section 2.4.1 also apply here, except for the
effects of children at different ages and the channels through which fertility affect women’s
labor supply. Previously we assume that all children matter for their mothers’ labor supply.
Total fertility is exogenous in the OLS model, and endogenous in the IV model but can be
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instrumented. Now we assume that only children under six can have such an impact, and
is exogenous in OLS and instrumented in the IV model. Previously we assume that the
length of exposure to relaxation determines the total number of children ever born. The
prediction would be that the longer a woman was exposed, the more children she could
have had. Now we impose an additional assumption that exposed time affects fertility
through its impact on the number of recently-born children but not on older children. The
prediction is that the longer a woman was exposed, the less likely that she could have had
given births recently.
2.5 Results
Table 2.2 to Table 2.7 present the main results from OLS and 2SLS specifications. Since
the OLS specifications involve individual fixed effects which is only applicable to panels,
the OLS estimators use only repeatedly surveyed samples.
Table 2.2 to 2.4 show the estimation results of specifications in Section 2.4.1. The
OLS estimates are summarized in Table 2.2, where I only report the parameters of the key
explanatory variable, the total number of children. The result of the base regressions in
the first column shows that without controlling for any fixed effects, having more children
decreases women’s working time as wage earners and increases their farming time, and
women with more children have lower incomes. Controlling for survey year fixed effects
does not change these results much, but controlling for community fixed effects does. Effects
of children on working time as wage earners and income become zero in this case. Effect on
farming time is still positive and significant but the size of this effect drops a lot. Controlling
for individual fixed effects instead of community fixed effects does not significantly change
these results. The last column indicates that the effect of fertility on women’s working
time as wage earners is negative, while those on farming time and income are positive.
Although the estimates are not statistically significantly different from the first column,
none of them is statistically powerful to conclude anything definitively. This gives us a
64
good reason to switch to the IV approach to explore the question from an alternative
perspective. Although not reported here, the coefficients of the other control variables all
have predicted signs: positive for women’s age and education and negative for age squared.
Estimates on men’s age and education are more ambiguous, which however is not a big
issue since most of them are not significant.
Table 2.3 shows the estimation results of the first stage of 2SLS. Since there are too
many interaction terms with community fixed effects, I do not report all of them but only
the signs that are shown most. Most of them are significant at 1% or 5% level, and the
magnitude of these coefficients are not small compared to the other non-instrument vari-
ables. The interaction terms of gender of the first child and exposed time with community
fixed effects exhibits the status of each community as I do not set a baseline community in
the regressions. As in the OLS, adding survey year fixed effects do not change the results
much. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficients of first child being a girl are positive
for all communities, which says that women with a first girl tended to have more children.
The only thing that contradicts our intuition is that the interaction terms with exposed
time are mostly negative. A natural prediction is that women who had experienced a longer
time of relaxation would have had more opportunities to give births and thus had more
children. Therefore the coefficients of these terms should be positive. The negative signs
now suggest that the longer a woman was exposed to the relaxation, the fewer children
she would have had. However, this can be explained by expectations of the stability of
the policy. If the relaxation was just released a short time ago, people might doubt its
persistency and take prompt actions to give more births. If the relaxation was already
firmly in place for many years, people would expect it to be a durable policy and would
not rush to have children. All the other women’s characteristics have the predicted signs:
positive for age and negative for age squared and education. The first stage estimations
do not fail the weak identification test, and the F -statistics are beyond 10.
Table 2.4 shows the second stage estimation results of 2SLS. The other coefficients apart
from that of the total number of children exhibit sensible results: working time and income
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are increasing in age and education and decreasing in age squared, while farming time is
increasing in age and decreasing in age squared and education. As to the key coefficient of
number of children, without controlling for survey year fixed effects, having more children
increases women’s farming time and decreases their income. After controlling for survey
year fixed effects, these effects disappear. Effects of fertility on women’s working time as
wage earners are always insignificant with or without survey year fixed effects. Compared
to column (3) in Table 2.2, estimates on working time as wage earners and income have
the same sign but do not have enough statistical power either. OLS in Table 2.2 shows a
significant impact of children on women’s farming time, which is true in the 2SLS when
survey year fixed effects not are controlled for. Controlling for survey year fixed effects
drives this impact to be insignificant. Overall, the estimates are not statistically significant
and not sufficiently powerful to draw any conclusions, although the F -statistics far exceed
10 — the rule of thumb for valid instruments, and the regression results do not fail the
over-identification test.
Next I switch to using small children instead of total fertility as the key explanatory
variable as is described in Section 2.4.2. I run through a similar procedure with both OLS
and IV estimations, which examine the effects of having children under six on women’s
labor market outcomes, and the results are presented in Table 2.5 to 2.7.
Table 2.5 shows that now after controlling for community fixed effects, there is still a
significantly negative impact of number of small children on women’s working time as wage
earners and their income. When controlling for individual fixed effects, the magnitudes of
the estimates do not change much, although the significance levels drop. The effects on
working time are no longer significant but that on income still is. And for each outcome,
the estimates do not change as much as what we have in Table 2.2 when adding more fixed
effects. It suggests that using number of small children instead of all children is probably
a better approximation of the true model.
The 2SLS estimation results are presented in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7. Table 2.6 sum-
marizes the first stage estimates. Again I reduce the coefficients of the large bundle of
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interaction terms to the dominant signs. Women’s age and age squared have opposite
signs to those in Table 2.3, which make sense because now the dependent variable is the
number of children under six. The older a woman is, the less likely that she will have a
small child. The coefficients of the interaction terms between gender of the first child and
community fixed effects are mostly negative, which seems to be contradictory to our intu-
ition but actually is not. Gender of the first child only determines whether one is eligible to
enjoy the benefits of relaxation, but are not necessarily positively correlated with whether
the second child is under six or not. The coefficients of the interactions with exposed time
are mostly negative, saying that for women under 45 in relaxed regions, the longer they
were exposed to the relaxation, the less likely they were to have a second child under six.
This can be explained by the same argument for Table 2.3. Actually that argument makes
more sense in the case of small children rather than children at any age: a woman who was
allowed to have a second child just a short time ago was more likely to have a recently-born
child than a woman who was always able to have another child.
Finally Table 2.7 presents the estimation results of the main equation. After controlling
for survey year fixed effects, the estimated effect of small children on farming time turns
from positive to negative and insignificant. The effect on working time as wage earners
remains, while the estimate on income becomes much smaller and insignificant. These
results are consistent with column (3) in Table 2.5 except for income. All the other control
variables except the number of small children have predicted signs. The F -statistics obey
the rule of thumb, and the regressions do not fail the weak instrument test or the over-
identification test. Although we still can not conclude anything for farming time or income,
the IV results tell us that having an additional child under six will decrease a woman’s
working time by 6 hours a week, or 17% or the average working time. This is a big negative
effect, especially when we we consider the case in rural China where incomes of households
are relatively low and most women work full time as men do. Returns from working as
wage earners are usually much higher than working on the farm and form a large part of
income in the household. Thus the cost of having another child is a big reduction in the
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income of the household when the child is small.
The negative impact of small children on working time is not reflected by a correspond-
ing reduction in income because here I use the gross income which includes income from
assets. But we can see this issue by looking at the sectors that women worked in. Table
2.12 in Appendix 2.C shows the estimation results of a set of 2SLS. The dependent vari-
ables are binary variables indicating whether one was working in state-owned enterprises,
private firms or agricultural sectors, which are mutually exclusive categories, conditional
on working as a wage earner. Women with small children were less likely to work in state-
owned sectors and more likely to work in private sectors. Positions in private sectors are
usually less stable and beneficial than those in state-owned sectors. The causality is not
obvious though. It can be that women who work in sectors with more flexibility could have
more children as they wish to, or those who prefer to have more children tend to choose
jobs that give them more freedom, or women with more children are at a disadvantage in
the labor market and have to stay in more volatile sectors. It is beyond the purpose of this
paper to discuss the channels, so I just present the facts that we can observe.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Robustness
A potential problem of the main analysis is that the timing of relaxation is not precisely
pinned down. In the main analysis I use the first year that a community is observed to
be relaxed as the time of relaxation. This is not true for communities that were already
relaxed when entering the survey. Since this type of communities takes a large part of the
whole sample (81 out of 181), I exclude such communities from the sample and apply the
IV method to check if the effects still exist. Appendix 2.D presents the estimation results
using the restricted sample.
The first stage estimation results in Table 2.13 are similar to the results in Table 2.6.
The coefficients of exposed time and its interaction with girl are mostly significant at the
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1% level. The coefficients on the other interaction terms are also significant at the 1% level.
And estimates on the other control variables all behave well in the sense that they are all
consistent with our predictions and previous findings. Table 2.14 presents the results of
the main equation. Similar to our main results, having small children decreases women’s
working time as wage earners but has no impact on their gross income. The reduction
of working time is even larger than what we have found in the main analysis. Here we
also find a positive effect of small children on women’s farming time, and the magnitude is
close to the reduced working time as wage earners. This may be suggesting some kind of
substitution between working as wage earners and working on one’s own farm, but more
evidence is needed to make such claims.
2.6.2 Validity of Instruments
The instruments are only valid when two assumptions are satisfied: 1) the instruments
are correlated with number of children (relevance assumption); 2) the instruments are not
correlated with u (exogeneity assumption); 3) the instruments only affect the outcomes
through their effects on fertility (exclusion restriction). The first assumption can be tested
by the F -statistics of the first stage regressions which we have already done. The second
assumption is examined and supported by over-identification tests. In addition, Table
2.9 to 2.11 also provide evidence for exogenous instruments, which show that there is no
systematic difference between women in different groups and relaxation is not endogenous
with son preference.
An alternative specification of 2SLS can be used to test the exclusion restriction of the
instruments. We can specify the original second stages (equation (2.6) and (2.10)) as
yijt = α0 + α1 ̂childrenijt + 181∑
j=1
α2jcommunityj +
181∑
j=2
α3,jgirlij × communityj
+
181∑
j=2
α4,jexposedtimeijt × communityj +α5Xijt + δt + uijt, (2.11)
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and
yijt = α0 + α1 ̂smallchildrenijt + 181∑
j=1
α2jcommunityj +
181∑
j=2
α3,jgirlij × communityj
+
181∑
j=2
α4,jexposedtimeijt × communityj +α5Xijt + δt + uijt. (2.12)
The second stages include the interaction terms of gender of the first child and exposed
time with community fixed effects with a concern that these variables may directly affect the
outcomes and not be good instruments. Table 2.15 in Appendix 2.E shows the estimation
results of equation (2.11), where the estimates of the key variable differ a lot from Table
2.4. The effects of children on working time as wage earners become negative and those
on farming time and income are positive. But still none of these results are significant to
draw any conclusions. Table 2.16 presents results of equation (2.12). Compared to Table
2.7, the effects of small children on working time as wage earners are more negative and
still significant, and do not vary much when survey year fixed effects are also controlled
for. Effects on farming time and income are both negative but lack statistical power to
exclude zero effects. All the other control variables have predicted signs, either significant
or not. In both regressions, the F−statistics look good and neither the weak instrument
tests nor the overidentification tests are failed. The estimates of the interactions of gender
of the first child and exposed time with community fixed effects are not jointly significant
in the second stages, suggesting that even if these variables do affect the outcomes directly,
their impact is small enough to be neglected.
Apart from all the above tests, we also need to justify that there was no pre-existing
trends that generated differences between relaxed and non-relaxed regions. There is no
universal method to do so and a widely-used approach is to conduct a placebo test, which
is not feasible here. Ideally we would have a single year of relaxation and compare relaxed
and non-relaxed communities before and after. In practice, relaxation started before the
survey and was gradually implemented, making it impossible to do so. Using a subset of
70
communities does not work either due to the highly unbalanced panel. For example, if 2000
is chosen as a relaxation time, we need a control group with communities never relaxed
and a treatment group with communities relaxed in 2000, and the treatment group must
consist of communities observed in at least two rounds before and after 2000. This leaves
us a treatment group with 7 communities which is not representative due to a small sample
size.
I hereby do an imperfect but informative test instead. I use the initially sampled
communities (those engaged in the first round of survey in 1989 and followed up in later
rounds) to construct three groups: (a) communities that were relaxed at the beginning; (b)
communities that were never relaxed throughout the survey; (c) communities that were
relaxed sometime in-between. Group (a) and (b) constitute the control groups and (b)
the treatment group. Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 show the trends of community-level labor
market facts throughout the survey, including wages by gender and of several representative
occupations, labor force participation in different sectors and marketization. The problem
of this test is that the treated communities were not relaxed at the same time. Therefore
this is not an illustration of the “true” similar trends between treatment and control groups.
But it does show patterns that are consistent with the hypothesis of exogeneity: there
no significant differences between relaxed and non-relaxed communities in terms of labor
market status.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of childbearing on women’s labor supply and income. I use
the relaxation of China’s One Child Policy to construct instruments for fertility, and find
that although total fertility does not have significant impact on female labor supply or
income, having additional children under six years old after the first birth will decrease
women’s time of working a lot. This result is robust to more restricted samples, and the
validity of the instruments is justified by various tests.
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Figure 2.1: Distributions of Women’s Age at First, Second and Last Births
A. Age at First Birth
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B. Age at Second Birth
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C. Age at Last Birth
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Figure 2.2: Community-level Average Wages
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Figure 2.3: Other Community-level Labor Market Outcomes
Labor Force Participation in Different Sectors
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Total
Number of children ever born Number of children alive under six
One child Two or more children No small children Having small children
Women’s characteristics
Age 42.49 39.39 44.07 45.04 31.48
(8.824) (10.28) (7.505) (7.468) (4.904)
Educational years 6.266 6.857 5.963 5.979 7.505
(3.339) (3.156) (3.390) (3.448) (2.462)
Labor force participation 0.991 0.985 0.994 0.993 0.983
(0.0951) (0.121) (0.0785) (0.0852) (0.129)
Hours/week working as wage earners 36.10 38.72 34.76 36.09 36.12
(24.32) (26.29) (23.14) (24.38) (24.06)
Hours/week working on farm 16.69 15.32 17.40 17.21 14.44
(16.34) (15.00) (16.95) (16.54) (15.29)
Annual income (thousand yuan) 9.598 10.56 9.106 9.937 8.131
(10.40) (11.79) (9.585) (10.47) (9.990)
Spouse’s characteristics
Age 43.64 40.54 45.22 46.15 32.78
(8.970) (10.35) (7.711) (7.733) (4.953)
Educational years 7.889 8.012 7.826 7.812 8.218
(2.762) (2.709) (2.788) (2.828) (2.438)
Labor force participation 0.993 0.988 0.996 0.994 0.990
(0.0825) (0.110) (0.0642) (0.0784) (0.0982)
Hours/week working as wage earners 47.45 48.30 47.02 47.69 46.45
(27.68) (27.87) (27.59) (27.89) (26.76)
Hours/week working on farm 15.43 14.96 15.67 15.48 15.20
(16.42) (16.26) (16.51) (16.29) (17.03)
Annual income (thousand yuan) 12.57 14.01 11.84 13.00 10.71
(15.98) (18.06) (14.76) (15.02) (19.51)
Women’s working sector
State-owned enterprises 0.190 0.310 0.0904 0.183 0.201
(0.392) (0.462) (0.287) (0.387) (0.400)
Private firms 0.250 0.259 0.243 0.227 0.290
(0.433) (0.438) (0.429) (0.419) (0.454)
Agricultural sectors 0.535 0.405 0.643 0.561 0.491
(0.499) (0.491) (0.479) (0.496) (0.500)
N 16351 7668 8683 10764 5587
mean coefficients; standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 2.2: OLS Estimation Results of Total Fertility on Women’s Labor Supply and Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: working time as wage earners
Number of children -1.635∗∗ -1.550∗∗ 0.496 -3.053
(0.693) (0.694) (0.577) (2.404)
N 7352 7352 7352 7352
R2 0.047 0.057 0.208 0.566
Dependent variable: working time on farm
Number of children 1.656∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗ 0.551
(0.457) (0.441) (0.268) (1.332)
N 8302 8302 8302 8302
R2 0.050 0.147 0.331 0.493
Dependent variable: log(income)
Number of children -0.0908∗∗∗ -0.0844∗∗∗ 0.0141 0.0155
(0.0233) (0.0220) (0.0174) (0.0544)
N 12023 12023 12023 12023
R2 0.151 0.265 0.344 0.550
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Community fixed effects No No Yes No
Individual fixed effects No No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level. Other control variables
include woman’s and spouse’s age, age squared and educational years.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: First Stage Results of Total Fertility
Dependent variable: Dependent variable of the main equation
number of children ever born Hours/week working as wage earners Hours/week on farm log(woman’s income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girl × Community + + + + + +
Exposed time× Community - - - - - -
Girl × Exposed time× Community - - - - - -
Age 0.114∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0195) (0.0200) (0.0156) (0.0159)
Age squared -0.00122∗∗∗ -0.00125∗∗∗ -0.00170∗∗∗ -0.00180∗∗∗ -0.00147∗∗∗ -0.00152∗∗∗
(0.000261) (0.000267) (0.000256) (0.000267) (0.000194) (0.000200)
Educational years -0.0186∗∗∗ -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.000578 -0.000937 -0.00990∗ -0.00972∗
(0.00539) (0.00554) (0.00606) (0.00619) (0.00512) (0.00530)
Spouse’s age 0.0390∗ 0.0398∗ 0.0473∗∗ 0.0482∗∗ 0.0479∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗∗
(0.0211) (0.0208) (0.0193) (0.0189) (0.0152) (0.0151)
Spouse’s age squared -0.000352 -0.000353 -0.000434∗ -0.000445∗ -0.000474∗∗∗ -0.000465∗∗∗
(0.000243) (0.000240) (0.000242) (0.000237) (0.000180) (0.000179)
Spouse’s educational years 0.00282 0.00412 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0109∗ 0.0112∗
(0.00555) (0.00555) (0.00699) (0.00696) (0.00597) (0.00598)
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 7352 7352 8302 8302 12023 12023
R2 0.557 0.561 0.472 0.475 0.496 0.498
F−statistics 2836.9 2850.5 279.4 2586.5 245.1 3652.0
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: 2SLS Results of Total Fertility on Women’s Time of Working and Income
Dependent variable: Hours/week working as wage earner Hours/week working on farm log(woman’s income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of children 1.563 1.681 4.030∗∗∗ -0.0785 -0.294∗∗∗ 0.0603
(1.146) (1.202) (0.858) (0.677) (0.0662) (0.0449)
Age 0.914∗ 1.012∗ -0.427 0.909∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.0796∗∗∗
(0.531) (0.539) (0.343) (0.322) (0.0231) (0.0223)
Age squared -0.0163∗∗ -0.0173∗∗∗ 0.00302 -0.0105∗∗∗ -0.00127∗∗∗ -0.000926∗∗∗
(0.00637) (0.00646) (0.00399) (0.00377) (0.000277) (0.000271)
Educational years 0.147 0.193 -0.795∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ 0.0617∗∗∗ 0.0293∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.120) (0.0923) (0.0711) (0.00557) (0.00435)
Spouse’s age 0.200 0.197 -0.477 0.233 0.0851∗∗∗ 0.0184
(0.489) (0.493) (0.309) (0.271) (0.0211) (0.0190)
Spouse’s age squared -0.00220 -0.00198 0.00329 -0.00207 -0.000867∗∗∗ -0.000249
(0.00536) (0.00541) (0.00340) (0.00295) (0.000249) (0.000225)
Spouse’s educational years -0.142 -0.116 -0.367∗∗∗ -0.0313 0.0427∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.118) (0.0918) (0.0832) (0.00562) (0.00431)
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.202 0.206 0.233 0.330 0.232 0.361
N 7352 7352 8302 8302 12023 12023
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 67.935 63.766 58.196 56.526 68.578 66.134
Hansen J statistic 0.051 3.442 36.194 0.114 60.780 3.711
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level. Instruments include the interactions between gender of the first child and community fixed effects,
interactions between exposed time and the community fixed effects, and the triple interactions.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: OLS Estimation Results of Small Children on Women’s Labor Supply and
Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: working time as wage earners
Number of children -2.483∗∗∗ -3.065∗∗∗ -2.394∗∗∗ -1.673
(0.904) (0.923) (0.837) (1.344)
N 7352 7352 7352 7352
R2 0.046 0.057 0.209 0.566
Dependent variable: working time on farm
Number of children 2.652∗∗∗ 0.280 -0.322 -0.810
(0.878) (0.897) (0.681) (0.873)
N 8302 8302 8302 8302
R2 0.049 0.144 0.330 0.493
Dependent variable: log(income)
Number of children -0.170∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.0871∗∗∗ -0.0662∗
(0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0252) (0.0347)
N 12023 12023 12023 12023
R2 0.151 0.264 0.345 0.550
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Community fixed effects No No Yes No
Individual fixed effects No No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level. Other control variables
include woman’s and spouse’s age, age squared and educational years.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: First Stage Results of Small Children
Dependent variable: Dependent variable of the main equation
number of children ever born Hours/week working as wage earners Hours/week on farm log(woman’s income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girl × Community + + + + + +
Exposed time× Community - - - - - -
Girl × Exposed time× Community - - - - - -
Age -0.111∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.0942∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.0957∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.00909) (0.00856)
Age squared 0.00113∗∗∗ 0.00101∗∗∗ 0.000966∗∗∗ 0.000834∗∗∗ 0.00103∗∗∗ 0.000884∗∗∗
(0.000125) (0.000123) (0.000127) (0.000119) (0.000103) (0.0000961)
Educational years -0.00146 -0.00141 -0.000693 0.000691 -0.000979 0.00000252
(0.00162) (0.00163) (0.00214) (0.00224) (0.00170) (0.00176)
Spouse’s age -0.0339∗∗∗ -0.0365∗∗∗ -0.0425∗∗∗ -0.0404∗∗∗ -0.0382∗∗∗ -0.0399∗∗∗
(0.00941) (0.00909) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.00791) (0.00747)
Spouse’s age squared 0.000294∗∗∗ 0.000326∗∗∗ 0.000390∗∗∗ 0.000376∗∗∗ 0.000336∗∗∗ 0.000365∗∗∗
(0.0000952) (0.0000914) (0.000108) (0.000104) (0.0000810) (0.0000743)
Spouse’s educational years 0.000687 0.00118 0.00172 0.00276 0.000343 0.00148
(0.00206) (0.00199) (0.00240) (0.00235) (0.00186) (0.00182)
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 7352 7352 8302 8302 12023 12023
R2 0.519 0.529 0.506 0.535 0.497 0.525
F−statistics 6602.88 1242.93 960.146 7895.01 661.176 7749.24
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: 2SLS Results of Small Children on Women’s Time of Working and Income
Dependent variable: Hours/week working as wage earner Hours/week working on farm log(women’s income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of children under six -4.864∗ -6.119∗∗ 8.533∗∗∗ -2.433 -0.877∗∗∗ -0.150
(2.743) (2.768) (2.962) (2.360) (0.149) (0.104)
Age 0.578 0.599 1.018∗∗ 0.662∗ -0.00346 0.0725∗∗∗
(0.571) (0.567) (0.468) (0.368) (0.0278) (0.0228)
Age squared -0.0128∗∗ -0.0131∗∗ -0.0118∗∗ -0.00812∗∗ 0.0000568 -0.000867∗∗∗
(0.00654) (0.00652) (0.00487) (0.00399) (0.000318) (0.000270)
Educational years 0.108 0.163 -0.797∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ 0.0629∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.118) (0.0924) (0.0699) (0.00542) (0.00427)
Spouse’s age 0.0492 0.00529 0.140 0.120 0.0334 0.0152
(0.505) (0.512) (0.343) (0.291) (0.0223) (0.0201)
Spouse’s age squared -0.000939 -0.000311 -0.00246 -0.00103 -0.000391 -0.000225
(0.00552) (0.00561) (0.00357) (0.00312) (0.000248) (0.000234)
Spouse’s educational years -0.137 -0.100 -0.307∗∗∗ -0.0270 0.0407∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.118) (0.0937) (0.0803) (0.00531) (0.00436)
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.201 0.205 0.216 0.328 0.187 0.362
N 7352 7352 8302 8302 12023 12023
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 24.426 27.705 42.107 40.044 43.701 38.945
Hansen J statistic 0.042 1.174 25.092 0.099 26.175 3.355
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level. Instruments include the interactions between gender of the first child and community fixed effects,
interactions between exposed time and the community fixed effects, and the triple interactions.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix
2.A Likelihood of Missing Outcomes and Fertility
Table 2.8: Correlation between Likelihood of Missing Outcomes and Fertility
Dependent variable Likelihood of working time missing Likelihood of income missing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of children -0.00197 -0.00789∗∗
(0.00284) (0.00316)
Number of small children 0.0114 0.00408
(0.00703) (0.00672)
Age -0.00287 -0.00201 -0.0130∗∗ -0.0134∗∗
(0.00437) (0.00441) (0.00530) (0.00550)
Age squared 0.0000465 0.0000379 0.000146∗∗ 0.000150∗∗
(0.0000495) (0.0000498) (0.0000601) (0.0000620)
Educational years -0.00113 -0.00109 -0.00140 -0.00124
(0.000949) (0.000959) (0.000976) (0.000965)
Spouse’s age -0.00590 -0.00544 -0.00244 -0.00268
(0.00429) (0.00425) (0.00525) (0.00526)
Spouse’s age squared 0.0000574 0.0000531 0.0000225 0.0000241
(0.0000468) (0.0000466) (0.0000556) (0.0000560)
Spouse’s educational years -0.00118 -0.00122 -0.000969 -0.00102
(0.000871) (0.000867) (0.000932) (0.000927)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.152 0.152 0.0834 0.0829
N 16458 16458 16458 16458
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level. Missing working time indicates neither working
time as wage earners or on farm is observed. All regressions are conditional on that the woman was working.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.B Exogeneity of Instruments
Table 2.9: Difference-in-differences Analysis for Observable Exogenous Variables
Relaxed Regions Non-relaxed Regions
Diff-in-Diff
Gender of first child Girl Boy G-B Diff. Girl Boy G-B Diff.
Female age 36.81 36.66 0.15 36.08 36.17 -0.09 0.24
(0.104) (0.100) (0.145) (0.167) (0.153) (0.227) (0.268)
Female educational years 6.92 6.87 0.05 7.53 7.56 -0.02 0.07
(0.047) (0.046) (0.066) (0.095) (0.083) (0.126) (0.131)
Spouse’s age 38.18 38.12 0.06 37.85 37.88 -0.03 0.09
(0.110) (0.105) (0.152) (0.178) (0.166) (0.244) (0.284)
Spouse’s educational years 8.21 8.28 -0.07 9.04 9.03 0.01 -0.08
(0.038) (0.038) (0.054) (0.077) (0.067) (0.102) (0.107)
Standard errors are in parentheses
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Table 2.10: Relationship between Early Period Sex Ratio and Timing of Relaxation
Dependent variable: All communities Initially non-relaxed communities
Relaxed years by 2011 (1) (2)
Percentage of male of 1980-84 cohorts 0.661 -4.070
(5.071) (6.343)
Near open trade area -1.789 0.656
(2.112) (2.372)
Road -0.193 -0.906
(1.002) (1.383)
Telegraph -4.948 -10.60
(3.084) (5.689)
Telephone 2.263 -2.621
(2.002) (2.703)
Postal service 6.699∗ 12.88∗
(2.940) (5.606)
Newspaper received daily -2.908 -1.613
(2.190) (2.604)
Electricity -7.505∗ 0
(3.737) (.)
Distance to bus stop -0.350 -0.303
(0.185) (0.188)
Distance to train station -0.0186 -0.00709
(0.0102) (0.0118)
Enterprise -0.729 -2.812
(1.895) (2.451)
Farmland 10.33∗∗∗ 2.597
(2.242) (2.786)
N 100 47
R2 0.377 0.281
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: Relationship between Violation of Relaxation Rule and Community Charac-
teristics
Dependent variable: All communities Initially non-relaxed communities
Violation rate of relaxation rule (1) (2)
Near open trade area 0.0499∗∗ 0.0643∗∗
(0.0234) (0.0312)
Road -0.0123 -0.0311
(0.0115) (0.0186)
Telegraph 0.00162 -0.0295
(0.0271) (0.0430)
Telephone 0.0297 0.0147
(0.0237) (0.0395)
Postal service -0.00808 0.0221
(0.0278) (0.0476)
Newspaper received daily -0.0550∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0348)
Electricity 0.0149 0
(0.0458) (.)
Distance to bus stop 0.00467∗ 0.00286
(0.00239) (0.00307)
Distance to train station 0.0000582 -0.000151
(0.000129) (0.000180)
Enterprise 0.00638 0.00297
(0.0197) (0.0296)
Farmland 0.00321 0.0154
(0.0240) (0.0357)
N 135 71
R2 0.124 0.268
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.C Effects on Women’s Working Sectors
Table 2.12: 2SLS Results of Small Children on Women’s Working Sectors
Dependent variable State-owned sectors Private sectors Agricultural sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of children under six 0.00585 -0.102∗∗ 0.0981∗ 0.155∗∗∗ -0.0839 -0.0416
(0.0379) (0.0425) (0.0534) (0.0563) (0.0576) (0.0529)
Age -0.0123∗ -0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ -0.0137 -0.0110
(0.00725) (0.00697) (0.00815) (0.00842) (0.00936) (0.00819)
Age squared 0.000116 0.000197∗∗∗ -0.000295∗∗∗ -0.000338∗∗∗ 0.000173∗ 0.000143
(0.0000747) (0.0000701) (0.0000900) (0.0000924) (0.000104) (0.0000908)
Educational years 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.00190 0.000394 -0.0129∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗∗
(0.00185) (0.00199) (0.00169) (0.00178) (0.00202) (0.00200)
Spouse’s age 0.00299 0.00390 -0.0160∗∗ -0.0125∗ 0.0150∗∗ 0.0105∗
(0.00530) (0.00528) (0.00694) (0.00687) (0.00689) (0.00610)
Spouse’s age squared -0.0000265 -0.0000321 0.000164∗∗ 0.000125 -0.000163∗∗ -0.000116∗
(0.0000545) (0.0000540) (0.0000772) (0.0000764) (0.0000781) (0.0000682)
Spouse’s educational years 0.00776∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.000159 -0.00161 -0.00727∗∗∗ -0.00822∗∗∗
(0.00184) (0.00191) (0.00174) (0.00179) (0.00194) (0.00190)
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.480 0.489 0.123 0.275 0.402 0.538
F -stat of first stage 11198.7 8460.9 11198.7 8460.9 11198.7 8460.9
N 11792 11792 11792 11792 11792 11792
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 51.042 45.058 51.042 45.058 51.042 45.058
Hansen J statistic 9.406 8.078 14.531 12.982 5.272 0.053
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level. Instruments include the interactions between gender of the first child and community
fixed effects, interactions between exposed time and the community fixed effects, and the triple interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.D Estimations with Restricted Samples
Table 2.13: First Stage Results of Small Children (Initially Non-relaxed)
Dependent variable: Dependent variable of the main equation
number of children ever born Hours/week working as wage earners Hours/week on farm log(woman’s income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girl × Community + + + + + +
Exposed time× Community - - - - - -
Girl × Exposed time× Community - - - - - -
Age -0.0946∗∗∗ -0.0872∗∗∗ -0.0813∗∗∗ -0.0768∗∗∗ -0.0903∗∗∗ -0.0837∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0113) (0.0108)
Age squared 0.000929∗∗∗ 0.000824∗∗∗ 0.000642∗∗∗ 0.000576∗∗∗ 0.000801∗∗∗ 0.000712∗∗∗
(0.000179) (0.000171) (0.000165) (0.000164) (0.000132) (0.000121)
Educational years -0.00107 -0.000898 -0.000310 0.00343 -0.0000831 0.00212
(0.00212) (0.00215) (0.00319) (0.00329) (0.00255) (0.00258)
Spouse’s age -0.0407∗∗∗ -0.0442∗∗∗ -0.0567∗∗∗ -0.0506∗∗∗ -0.0450∗∗∗ -0.0438∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.0156) (0.0113) (0.0104)
Spouse’s age squared 0.000379∗∗∗ 0.000424∗∗∗ 0.000605∗∗∗ 0.000559∗∗∗ 0.000447∗∗∗ 0.000452∗∗∗
(0.000144) (0.000137) (0.000158) (0.000165) (0.000119) (0.000107)
Spouse’s educational years 0.0000282 0.000538 -0.00285 -0.000825 -0.00353 -0.00191
(0.00305) (0.00301) (0.00386) (0.00400) (0.00260) (0.00256)
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 3687 3687 2826 2826 5220 5220
R2 0.502 0.513 0.507 0.530 0.495 0.516
F−statistics 7127.28 2377.07 394.327 1408.19 477.682 11443.2
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.14: 2SLS Results of Small Children on Women’s Time of Working and Income
(Initially Non-relaxed)
Dependent variable: Hours/week working as wage earner Hours/week working on farm log(women’s income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of children under six -6.442 -7.832∗ 19.46∗∗∗ 7.461∗∗ -0.898∗∗∗ 0.0000235
(3.924) (4.160) (6.059) (3.742) (0.207) (0.156)
Age 0.0566 0.177 1.928∗∗ 1.626∗∗∗ -0.00391 0.0655∗∗
(0.673) (0.662) (0.849) (0.611) (0.0401) (0.0296)
Age squared -0.00736 -0.00896 -0.0187∗∗ -0.0178∗∗∗ 0.0000272 -0.000727∗∗
(0.00814) (0.00807) (0.00867) (0.00674) (0.000451) (0.000354)
Educational years 0.0845 0.168 -0.779∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ 0.0677∗∗∗ 0.0295∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.177) (0.150) (0.102) (0.00657) (0.00525)
Spouse’s age -0.0447 -0.125 0.902∗ 0.666 0.0430 0.0345
(0.791) (0.818) (0.542) (0.479) (0.0351) (0.0281)
Spouse’s age squared -0.000346 0.000938 -0.0102∗ -0.00478 -0.000422 -0.000417
(0.00868) (0.00901) (0.00607) (0.00536) (0.000414) (0.000339)
Spouse’s educational years -0.271∗ -0.221 -0.180 0.0626 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.164) (0.196) (0.168) (0.00808) (0.00553)
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
R2 0.202 0.209 0.0129 0.261 0.253 0.446
N 3687 3687 2826 2826 5220 5220
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 12.484 13.624 9.400 15.169 8.389 12.804
Hansen J statistic 3.145 4.587 6.333 0.121 3.339 0.050
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level. Instruments include the interactions between gender of the first child and community fixed effects,
interactions between exposed time and the community fixed effects, and the triple interactions.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.E Alternative Specifications of 2SLS
Table 2.15: 2SLS Results of Total Fertility on Women’s Time of Working and Income
Dependent variable: Hours/week working as wage earner Hours/week working on farm log(women’s income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of children -0.717 -0.467 2.214 1.790 0.144 0.128
(2.760) (2.797) (1.719) (1.640) (0.127) (0.120)
Girl × Community + + - - - -
Exposed time× Community + + - - + +
Age 1.374∗∗ 1.374∗∗ 0.701∗ 0.718∗ 0.0231 0.0757∗∗∗
(0.638) (0.635) (0.408) (0.399) (0.0286) (0.0285)
Age squared -0.0221∗∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗ -0.00846∗ -0.0000341 -0.000904∗∗∗
(0.00762) (0.00756) (0.00487) (0.00479) (0.000343) (0.000344)
Educational years 0.123 0.208 -0.542∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0306∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.138) (0.0899) (0.0715) (0.00541) (0.00461)
Spouse’s age 0.243 0.278 -0.163 -0.0592 0.0363∗ 0.0158
(0.531) (0.528) (0.259) (0.246) (0.0198) (0.0183)
Spouse’s age squared -0.00218 -0.00229 0.00107 0.000985 -0.000424∗ -0.000220
(0.00585) (0.00581) (0.00303) (0.00284) (0.000228) (0.000213)
Spouse’s educational years -0.212∗ -0.173 -0.194∗∗ -0.0497 0.0278∗∗∗ 0.0201∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.122) (0.0951) (0.0918) (0.00507) (0.00475)
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.254 0.260 0.336 0.379 0.333 0.389
F -stat of first stage 3057.6 3663.0 1875.1 5954.3 354.1 51868.3
N 7352 7352 8302 8302 12023 12023
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 51.408 33.818 39.325 37.933 53.904 48.492
Hansen J statistic 0.000 2.811 8.002 0.021 16.515 2.341
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level. Instruments include the interactions between gender of the first child and community fixed effects,
interactions between exposed time and the community fixed effects, and the triple interactions.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.16: 2SLS Results of Small Children on Women’s Time of Working and Income
Dependent variable: Hours/week working as wage earner Hours/week working on farm log(women’s income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of small children -9.389∗∗ -9.390∗∗ -1.581 -2.382 -0.0467 -0.154
(3.763) (3.812) (3.276) (2.910) (0.165) (0.157)
Girl × Community + + - - - -
Exposed time× Community + + - - + +
Age 0.278 0.388 0.865∗∗ 0.773∗∗ 0.0370 0.0785∗∗∗
(0.631) (0.611) (0.409) (0.361) (0.0283) (0.0249)
Age squared -0.0110 -0.0115∗ -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.00975∗∗ -0.000200 -0.000968∗∗∗
(0.00720) (0.00698) (0.00439) (0.00390) (0.000316) (0.000282)
Educational years 0.122 0.203∗ -0.542∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.121) (0.0897) (0.0716) (0.00510) (0.00432)
Spouse’s age -0.114 -0.0957 -0.115 -0.0632 0.0417∗∗ 0.0158
(0.550) (0.550) (0.310) (0.287) (0.0207) (0.0202)
Spouse’s age squared 0.000935 0.00105 0.000614 0.00102 -0.000481∗∗ -0.000225
(0.00605) (0.00608) (0.00343) (0.00319) (0.000239) (0.000235)
Spouse’s educational years -0.207∗ -0.164 -0.143∗ -0.00432 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.121) (0.0861) (0.0832) (0.00498) (0.00460)
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.245 0.252 0.332 0.376 0.337 0.392
F -stat of first stage 6245.24 1551.84 500.99 711.33 349.10 1118.20
N 7352 7352 8302 8302 12023 12023
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 3.426 6.751 24.805 11.772 27.474 13.651
Hansen J statistic 0.028 0.034 1.152 0.096 0.290 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level. Instruments include the interactions between gender of the first child and community fixed effects,
interactions between exposed time and the community fixed effects, and the triple interactions.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Chapter 3
Long-term Consequences of China’s Great Famine
1959-1961
3.1 Introduction
China’s great famine from 1959 to 1961 was one of the worst catastrophes in human history:
an estimated 15-30 million people died during the famine. 1 Plenty of studies explored
the causes of the famine, yet there is still limited understanding of its long-term health
and socioeconomic consequences for the survivors. Some papers examined the health con-
sequences on individuals exposed to the famine in their fetal period and early life and
found that prenatal and early-life malnutrition due to the famine have caused people to
grow shorter (Chen and Zhou, 2007; Meng and Qian, 2009; Gørgens et al., 2012). Others
looking at the economic consequences found that the great famine had a negative impact
on people’s educational attainment and labor supply (Almond et al., 2007; Meng and
Qian, 2009). Researches on inter-generational transfer found that the second generation’s
schooling is negatively impacted by parents’ in utero malnutrition (Kim et al., 2014).
In this paper, I aim to identify the long-run effects of the famine on health and socioe-
conomic outcomes of the survivors that have not been fully explored yet. Using regional
excess death rates during the famine to indicate exposure intensity to the famine and a
cross section of the 1954-1965 cohorts, I construct a difference-in-differences estimator to
examine the famine effects on the survivors’ health status and labor market outcomes dur-
ing their fifties, and intergenerational transfers of resources and education of the survivors
1See Riskin (199), Coale (1981), Yao (1999), Peng (1987) and Ashton et al. (1984).
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to their parents or offsprings. Cohorts born after the famine constitute the control group
while those born before or during the famine form the two treatment groups. I find that
the pre-famine cohorts were shorter than the post-famine cohorts, while the during-famine
cohorts were taller than the other two groups. Both the pre-famine and during-famine
groups attained lower education, transferred less resources to their parents and had their
children more educated than the post-famine group. Overall the famine had a negative im-
pact on the survivors’ education and intergenerational transfers of resources and a positive
impact on the education of their offsprings. The effects on the pre-famine group can be
attributed mainly to malnutrition as a child, whereas the during-famine group was affected
in utero or likelihood of not being born. And all these results concern the sensitivity of
the outcomes to the regional intensity of the famine, as is measured by excess death rate.
This paper extends the existing literature in several aspects. First, in contrast to
most previous studies that showed a negative impact of the famine on height (Chen and
Zhou, 2007; Gørgens et al., 2012), I find that the 1959-1961 cohorts were taller than the
later born cohorts , suggesting a strong selection among survivors of the famine, as is
also found in Meng and Qian (2009). I do find stunting effect for cohorts born before
the famine. Presumably there should be a bigger stunting effect on people born during
the famine, as is suggested by medical studies. It is found in the medical literature that
neonatal morbidity are much higher than post-neonatal morbidity, and neonatal mortality
are higher than mortality in normal circumstances. But due to selection we cannot observe
the true stunting effect on the during-famine cohorts. Second, I investigate a set of health
outcomes that have not been studied. To my best knowledge, only weight and obesity
have been studied as the health consequences of the China’s great famine. Literature on
the effects of the 1944-1945 Dutch famine explored health outcomes other than height
and BMI, such as mortality, birth weight, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, diabetes,
glucose tolerance, etc. (Ravelli et al., 1998, 1999; Roseboom et al., 2000, 2001, 2006, 2014;
Painter et al., 2005; Black et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2010). In the paper I look at various
indicators of health status, although not finding significant effects among them. Third,
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I examine the famine effects on a broader range of socioeconomic outcomes. Similar to
previous studies, I find that cohorts born during the famine attained less education and
lower earnings. Young (2005) suggested that lower fertility would reduce labor supply in
the long run and result in higher returns to human capital. But this study does not give the
same conclusion probably because Young studies AIDS in Africa for which selection is not
so important an issue as in the case of the Great Famine. I also examine the initial status
in the labor market of this population. For example, I look at whether they tended to work
in agricultural sectors or within their residing provinces. I do no find significant results in
either aspects though. Finally, I look at how the great famine affected intergenerational
transfers, such as transfers of resources to parents and transfers of education to children,
which is never studied in the context of China’s Great Famine. I find that the cohorts
exposed to the famine, i.e. the pre-famine and during-famine cohorts, made fewer transfers
of resources to their parents and had their children more educated. In contrast, Kim et al.
(2014) found that children of this population were less educated.
A major issue with studies on famine effects is the selection problem because only
survivors were observed. The estimation results will be biased if there is any unobservable
variable that is correlated with both survival and health or socioeconomic status. Gørgens
et al. (2012) addressed this issue by using characteristics of children of survivors to control
for selection and disentangle the stunting from the selection effects. Believing a positive
selection for survival, Meng and Qian (2009) estimated the impact on the upper quantiles
of the distribution of outcomes. I do a similar test using the top half of the population to
re-estimate the main equations. And the results in the main analysis become smaller or
even disappear.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 briefly introduces the background, Sec-
tion 3.3 describes the data used in this study, Section 3.4 presents the empirical strategies,
Section 3.5 summarized the results and Section 3.6 concludes the paper.
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3.2 Background
China’s Great Famine from late 1950s to early 1960s, also called “three years of natural
disasters”, is officially attributed to the sharp fall of grain output. However, recent studies
argued that the famine was mainly caused by other factors rather than weather, such as
food availability decline caused by the Great Leap Forward Movement launched in early
1958 (Ashton et al., 1984; Lin and Yang, 2000), deprivation of the right to withdraw from
collective farms (Lin, 1990), failure in consumption rationing caused by the communal
dining system (Chang and Wen, 1997), inflexible and progressive governmental procure-
ment (Lin and Yang, 2000; Kung and Lin, 2003; Li and Yang, 2005; Meng et al., 2010,
2013, 2015), etc. There is neither consensus over the severity of the famine. Estimated
lost population by scholars varies between 15 million and 30 million. When using death
rates in empirical studies, most researchers have to follow the overall death rates reported
by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, although little information is available on
how these data were collected or calculated. Nor is there agreements on the timing of the
famine. Some studies claimed that it actually started as early as late 1958 (Ashton et al.,
1984; Chang and Wen, 1997), while the majority of studies still considered the period of
1959 to 1961 to be the famine years.
This paper keeps with the 1959-1961 definition of the famine first because of the nature
of the questions studied. People born at the beginning of the famine when it was not
widespread were not as severely impacted as later cohorts, and even if it started in 1958,
the famine is likely to have affected only a small portion of the 1958 cohort. In addition,
the official statistics that we have to believe and use do not show much evidence that 1958
was a nationwide famine year. From Table 3.9 in Appendix 3.E we do not see a significant
sudden increase in the death rate of 1958. The birth rate of 1958 dropped a lot from that
of 1957, however not too much from the average of the previous three years, and not so
significant as those of the years 1959-1961. Therefore I consider 1958 as a pre-famine year
and 1959-1961 as the actual famine period when it had an extensive impact.
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Despite the debate on causes of the famine, there is a commonly accepted fact that
rural areas suffered much more severely than urban area. The urban-biased governmental
rationing system guaranteed urban households to have fixed quota of sustainable food,
while rural households could only keep what was left after the food procurement, which
aggravated the shortage of food when there was already a sudden drop in grain output.
And the household registration system restricted rural households strictly to their land
and allowed little rural-urban migration. In this paper I focus on rural samples which are
more likely to capture the effects of the famine.
3.3 Data
The individual level data come from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study
(CHARLS) which collects nationally representative sample of Chinese residents aged 45
and above. In this study I only use the baseline wave of CHARLS in 2011, which contains
around 10,000 households and 17,500 individuals over150 counties/districts in 33 province-
level districts. Hong Kong, Macau and Tibet were excluded from the sample, and Hainan
Province dropped out due to lack of information during the famine.
I construct the treatment and control groups with individuals born in rural areas be-
tween 1954 and 1965. Birth cohorts from 1954 to 1961 constitute the famine-treated group,
among which the 1954-1958 cohorts were exposed to the famine during early childhood and
the 1959-1961 cohorts were born in the famine. I expect that the famine impacted the two
groups in different ways. The 1962-1965 cohorts form the control group. Table 3.11 in
Appendix 3.F shows the cohort size by year and type of residence, and Table 3.12 shows
the cohort size by year and gender in rural areas. Although Table 3.11 does not show a
larger drop in cohort size in rural areas, it does not disapprove the fact that rural areas
were more severely impacted because urban population has more mobility and migration
is not taken into account.
The province-level data on mortality rates come from China’s State Bureau of Statistics.
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The key variable to indicate severity of the famine is the Excess Death Rate (EDR), which
is the difference between the natural death rate before the famine and the death rate of
the worst year of the famine. The natural death rate is defined by the average death rate
of 1956-1958 and 1960 is considered to be the worst year of the famine. Figure 3.10 in
Appendix 3.A shows the correlation between EDR and the decrease rate of cohort size 2
by province. It presents a significantly negative relationship between the excess death rate
and the shrink of cohort size, although the magnitude is slightly small.
Table 3.10 in Appendix 3.E presents the death rates for each province from which I
calculate EDR. Table 3.1 summarizes statistics from the sample.
3.4 Empirical Specification
3.4.1 Famine effects on health outcomes
The effects of the Great Famine on health are estimated using the following equations:
heightijt = α+
1965∑
t=1954
βtbirthijt +
1965∑
t=1954
γt(birthijt × EDRj) + δEDRj
+λ1genderijt + γj + ijt (3.1)
and
healthkijt = α+
1965∑
t=1954
βtbirthijt +
1965∑
t=1954
γt(birthijt × EDRj) + δEDRj
+λ1genderijt + λ2educijt + γj + ijt, (3.2)
where i denotes individual, j denotes province and t denotes year. birthijt is a dummy
variable for birth year and EDRj is the excess death rate of province j defined as above.
The dependent variable heightijt is the attained height of individual i and healthijt is an
indicator of have a certain disease or health problem, such as hypertension, dyslipidemia,
2This is calculated by dividing the difference between the average cohort size of 1954-1958 and that of
1959-1961 into the average cohort size of 1954-1958.
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cancer, heart disease, etc. educijt is the completed years of education of i. Education is
included in the latter equation because it is usually correlated with life styles and life-cycle
earnings, which are also correlated with health status.But it does not enter the former
equation because the attained height is usually determined before education is completed.
ijt is an error term clustered at the province-year level.
The above specifications as well as all the following ones assume that birth year and
EDR are exogenous. There is no question about the exogeneity of birth year, while the
exogeneity of EDR needs to be addressed. As is argued by previous studies (Lin 1990; Lin
and Yang, 2000; Li and Yang, 2005; Meng et al., 2009, 2010, 2013), EDR is determined
mostly by institutional factors such as governmental procurement and rationing. There
is little reason to believe that these administrative decisions are correlated with regional
characteristics that could have affected people’s health outcomes. Education may be en-
dogenous and is controlled for where necessary. Typically all specifications should involve
a province fixed effect on the right hand side, which is however captured by EDR and thus
drop out of the equations.
Two contrary results are possible: on the one hand, the Great Famine may have had
a severe negative impact on people’s nutrition and health and thus the during-the-famine
cohorts exhibit shorter height and worse health conditions; on the other hand, the selection
effect may be dominant and the survivors of the famine are taller and more healthy than
the other cohorts.
3.4.2 Famine effects on socioeconomic outcomes
The famine effects on socioeconomic outcomes are explored in several aspects: education,
labor market outcomes, personal relationship and intergenerational transfer of education.
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3.4.2.1 Education
The famine effects on education is examined by
educijt = α+
1965∑
t=1954
βtbirthijt +
1965∑
t=1954
γt(birthijt × EDRj) + δEDRj
+λ1genderijt + λ2siblingsijt + ijt, (3.3)
where educijt is i
′s completed years of education, genderijt is a dummy variable indicating
“male” and siblingsijt is the number of siblings i ever had, which enters the equation based
on the assumption of a “trade-off between quality and quantity” in children’s education
within a household. Parental educations is usually also included in such equations but not
here not only because they are not observed in most cases, but also because that generation
was born before the founding of People’s Republic of China and had hardly had any formal
education. It is unlikely that parental educations could have had any impact on their
children’s education.
3.4.2.2 Labor market outcomes
The famine effects on an individual’s behaviors in the labor market can be multifold and
I focus on one’s starting position and latest situation. I look at three outcomes: working
sector and location of the first job and current annual income.
The regression on the sector of the first job takes the form of
agricultureijt = α+
1965∑
t=1954
βtbirthijt +
1965∑
t=1954
γt(birthijt × EDRj) + δEDRj
+λ1genderijt + λ2educijt + ijt, (3.4)
where agricultureijt is a binary variable indicating whether i
′s first job is in agricultural
sectors. I control for education assuming that educational levels affect people’s choice of
jobs. It may be questionable because of possible reverse causality. People who believe that
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they are very likely to work in agriculture may tend to invest less in education. However,
this reverse causality may not be a big concern for the cohorts studied here in the context of
rural China. During the 1960s and 1970s, China had little social mobility and urban-rural
migration was strictly constrained by the household registration system. A child born in
rural areas was very unlikely to get rid of his rural status. Therefore it was not quite
plausible that parents would invest more in children’s education out of the expectation
that they would move to urban areas, and vice versa.
The regression on the location of the first job takes the form of
localijt = α+
1965∑
t=1954
βtbirthijt +
1965∑
t=1954
γt(birthijt × EDRj) + δEDRj
+λ1genderijt + λ2educijt + λ3agricultureijt + ijt, (3.5)
where localijt is a binary variable indicating whether i
′s first job is within the same province.
agricultureijt enters the equation as a control variable as the flexibility of jobs highly
depends on which sector to work in. Non-agricultural jobs provide more possibility to
migrate than agricultural ones.
The regression on current annual income takes the form of
incomeijt = α+
1965∑
t=1954
βtbirthijt +
1965∑
t=1954
γt(birthijt × EDRj) + δEDRj + λ1genderijt
+λ2educijt + λ3experienceijt + λ4experience
2
ijt + ijt, (3.6)
where incomeijt is i
′s total income from work in the last year including all activities that
earned money, and experienceijt is i
′s working experience calculated by subtracting the
age when starting to work from the current age. For those who had retired, incomeijt
is the value of annual retirement wage. Since a large proportion of individuals in the
treatment group had retired, dropping these observations will result in a too small sample
and misleading results, while including them does not cause big problems because the
retirement wage reflects the “value” of a worker in the labor market even after he quits
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and is still comparable to the income of workers on the market.
3.4.2.3 Transfers to parents
The Great Famine could also have impact on people’s behavioral patterns in interpersonal
relationship. The famine-impacted generations are more likely to have grown up in smaller
households, which could make them either more dependent on their family out of lone-
liness, or more distant from others due to a lack of interpersonal communication during
their childhood. This section is to investigate the famine effects on family relationship,
specifically the relationship with parents.
The relationship with parents is measured by regular transfers to parents. The famine
effect on this outcome is estimated by the equation
transferijt = α+
1965∑
t=1954
βtbirthijt +
1965∑
t=1954
γt(birthijt × EDRj) + δEDRj
+λ1genderijt + λ2educijt + λ3incomeijt + λ4siblingsijt + ijt, (3.7)
where transferijt is the value of regular transfer (annually) to parents conditional on at
least one of the parents is alive.
3.4.2.4 Intergenerational transfer of education
The outcome to study is intergenerational transfers, for which I focus on children’s educa-
tion. I investigate the famine effects on children’s education in two alternative ways: first
I look at the upper and lower bounds of children’s education in a household, and then I
look at the educational attainment of a child using his parents’ birth cohorts as control
variables.
The first set of regressions consists of the following two equations:
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highesteducijt = α+
1965∑
t=1954
βtbirthijt +
1965∑
t=1954
γt(birthijt × EDRj) + δEDRj
+λ1genderijt + λ2educijt + ijt, (3.8)
and
lowesteducijt = α+
1965∑
t=1954
βtbirthijt +
1965∑
t=1954
γt(birthijt × EDRj) + δEDRj
+λ1genderijt + λ2educijt + ijt, (3.9)
where highesteducijt and lowesteducijt indicate respectively the highest and lowest edu-
cational levels of children’s education in i′s household.
The second regression takes the following form:
educlijt = α+
1965∑
t=1954
βtbirthijt +
1965∑
t=1954
γt(birthijt × EDRj) + δEDRj
+λ1gender
l
ijt + λ2educijt + λ3father
l
ijt + λ4siblings
l
ijt + ijt, (3.10)
where l indicates the l-th child in i′s household; educlijt is the l-th child’s educational levels,
while educijt is the educational years of l
′s parent who is the main respondent (and also the
observation in the previous sections); genderlijt is a dummy for l to be “male” ; father
l
ijt is
a binary variable indicating whether parent i is the child’s father; siblingslijt is the number
of l′s siblings still living.
3.4.3 Alternative specifications
In addition to the main specifications above, I also exploit the effects of the famine from
the following aspects: the famine effects on the pre-famine, during-famine and post-famine
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groups instead of each birth cohort; the famine effects on the top of the distributions of
the population; the overall effects unconditional on individual characteristics.
3.4.3.1 Effects by time period
It is quite likely that the famine did impact people born in different periods as a whole, but
looking at effects year by year may not be powerful enough to reveal such effects. Thus I
examine effects of the famine on three groups: people born before, in or after the famine,
namely the pre-famine, during famine and post-famine groups. The general form of the
estimation equations takes this form:
yijk = α+
3∑
k=1
βkgroupijk +
3∑
k=1
γt(groupijk × EDRj) + δEDRj + λXijk + γj + ijk.
groupijk is a set of dummy variables denoting which birth group i belongs to, where k
takes three values: 1 for pre-famine group, 2 for during famine and 3 for post-famine. yijk
can be any outcome we have examined in the previous section, and Xijk are the individual
characteristics associated with each y.
This specification investigates the overall effect on each group which is decomposed by
extracting yearly effects that decreased statistical power.
3.4.3.2 Effects on top of the distributions
A major concern about all our analysis is selection which is generated by the fact that
we can only observe survivors of the famine. If we believe that individuals in the top of
the distributions of the outcomes were less affected by the famine, then we can use these
samples to partly address the selection problem. I use the observations in the top halves
of the distributions of the outcomes to re-estimate equations 3.1 to 3.10. The results show
the consequences of the famine on the potentially more advantaged people among whom
selection is of less concern.
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3.4.3.3 Unconditional effects
In all the previous sections, for outcomes apart from height and education we are looking at
the effects of the famine conditional on people’s education and/or labor market outcomes.
We may also be interested in a more general picture, specifically the overall unconditional
effects of the famine on people born before, in or after the famine. Thus I do similar
exercises as in Section 3.4.3.1 without controlling for variables in addition to EDR, birth
period and province fixed effects.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Main results
The parameters of interest are the coefficients of the interaction terms between birth year
and excess death rate in each regression. The estimation results are presented both in
tables and figures so that the patterns can be seen more clearly. I normalize the mean
of the coefficients of 1962 to 1965 to 0, and present the normalized coefficients of the
interactions between birth cohort and EDR, which is a more convenient way to show how
famine-affected cohorts deviated from the normal trend. In each set of regressions, I also
look at the heterogeneous effects between men and women by estimating the equations
using subsamples.
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 show the effects of the Great Famine on height. The pre-
famine cohorts are shorter than the post-famine cohorts, suggesting that people exposed
to the famine during their early life were very likely to be negatively impacted on their
attained height. The during-the-famine cohorts, especially the 1961 cohort exhibit higher
attainment of height, suggesting the existence of selection which is consistent with findings
of previous studies. The selection of height was huge among men but not among women,
which may be evidence that men are more vulnerable to the impact of lack of food. Effects
of the famine on other health outcomes are summarized in Figure 3.11 in Appendix 3.B
since these estimates do not have coherent patterns and thus are not quite conclusive.
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Figure 3.2 and Table 3.3 present the famine effects on educational attainment. The
during-the-famine cohorts had fewer years of education on average. This is also consistent
with the findings in the existing literature. However, the famine affected men and women in
slightly different ways. The 1960 cohort of men experienced the biggest drop in education
and the 1961 cohort converge to the average level of the post-famine cohorts. Women born
during the famine experienced a continuous decrease in education until 1961 and started
to recover after that.
The impact of the famine on labor market outcomes involves impact on the first job
and on the current income. Figure 3.3, 3.4 and Table 3.4 show the famine effects on the
choice of the first job. On average cohorts born during the famine were more likely to work
in agricultural sectors than their neighboring cohorts. Men of the three birth cohorts all
had high probabilities to remain on the farm, while only women born in 1960 showed a
clear tendency towards agricultural work. As to the location of the first job, the during-
the-famine cohorts of men exhibited no distinctive patterns while women born in the worst
year of the famine tended to be working outside their own birth province. But it is hard
to say that there existed any impact of the famine as a whole. Figure 3.5 and Table 3.5
show the famine effects on income which are inconclusive in general. There may be some
evidence that the effects of the famine were opposite between men and women: the famine
cohorts of men earned less than the other cohorts while the famine cohorts of women earned
more.
Figure 3.6 and Table 3.6 show the effects of the famine on transfers of resources to
parents conditional on parents still alive. After controlling for income and number of
siblings alive, the during-the-famine cohorts still tended to give less to their parents, which
is more prevalent in men than in women. This may be suggesting that the cohorts born
during the famine were less closely tied to their parents, but more evidence is needed to
conclude that.
The last figures and tables show the impact of the famine on intergenerational transfers
of education. Figure 3.7, 3.8 and Table 3.7 present the estimated famine effects on the
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upper and lower bounds of children’s education within a household. Figure 3.9 and Table
3.8 present results from the regression where each child is treated a single observation.
All estimations show that children with at least one parent born during the famine period
obtained a higher level of education, especially for children whose father was born during
the famine. These results should be treated with cautions because we only have information
of one parent for each child. The estimates are imprecise if we cannot control for both
parents’ births.
3.5.2 Additional results
Table 3.13 in Appendix 3.G summarizes the estimation results as in Section 3.4.3.1 as an
effort to show the general patterns of the famine effects. Since no significant results about
health outcomes are found in the main analysis, I do not include them in this part. The
post-famine group is used as the control group and Table 3.13 presents estimates of the
coefficients of the interaction terms for the other two groups. People exposed to the famine
during their infancy were slightly shorter than people born after the famine, and people
born during the famine were taller, although this is not a significant result. Both the pre-
famine and during-famine cohorts were less educated, but only the estimate of the latter
group is significant. As to the labor market outcomes, again it shows that people exposed
to the famine, either in early childhood or in utero were more likely to start working in
agricultural sectors and outside their own province, and earned less. However, none of these
effects are significant enough to draw any conclusions. Both groups made fewer transfers to
parents, where the during famine group transferred even less. It also says that both groups
had their children educated more, either by looking at the highest level or the lowest level
of children’s education, but only the effect on the highest level of children’s education of
the during-famine group is slightly significant. All these results are consistent with the
main findings, although not all of the estimates have enough power.
The estimated famine effects on the top of the distributions of the population are shown
in Figure 3.12 and 3.13 in Appendix 3.C. Again I do not include health outcomes in this
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part. The stunting effect on height of pre-famine group and the selection of height among
during-famine group still exist but both become small, which is quite natural since we are
using the top half of the height distribution of the population. The negative impact on the
education of the during-famine group is still significant, while that of the pre-famine group
becomes less obvious. There are no significant effects of the famine on either labor market
outcomes or children’s education, but a slight negative impact on transfers to parents still
exists, especially among the during-famine group.
Figure 3.14 and 3.15 in Appendix 3.D illustrate the overall patterns of the outcomes we
are interested in apart from height and education. Generally we can not conclude anything
from these fluctuating trends, suggesting that without controlling for education and other
individual characteristics, there are few overall differences between people born before, in
or after the famine.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the health and socioeconomic consequences of China’s Great Famine
from 1959 to 1961. It extends understanding of the famine by incorporating outcomes never
studied before. Utilizing nationwide household survey data and province-level death rates,
I find a huge selection in the height of the cohorts born during the famine, and a negative
impact of the famine on the height of the pre-famine cohorts. I also find evidence that
cohorts born in the famine were less educated, more likely to start working in agricultural
sectors, transferred less to parents and got their children more educated.
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Figure 3.1: Famine Effects on Attained Height (cm)
A. Whole Sample Regression
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B. Differential Effects by Gender
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Figure 3.2: Famine Effects on Education
A. Whole Sample Regression
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Figure 3.3: Famine Effects on Performance in the Job Market 1: Sector of First Job
A. Whole Sample Regression
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B. Differential Effects by Gender
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Figure 3.4: Famine Effects on Performance in the Job Market 2: Location of First Job
A. Whole Sample Regression
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B. Differential Effects by Gender
−
.
00
3
−
.
00
2
−
.
00
1
0
.
00
1
.
00
2
1955 1960 1965
Birth year
Dependent variable: first job in the same province
Coefficients of Birth_year*Excess_death_rate (Male)
−
.
00
6
−
.
00
4
−
.
00
2
0
.
00
2
.
00
4
1955 1960 1965
Birth year
Dependent variable: first job in the same province
Coefficients of Birth_year*Excess_death_rate (Female)
110
Figure 3.5: Famine Effects on Performance in the Job Market 3: Annual Income
A. Whole Sample Regression
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Figure 3.6: Famine Effects on Family Transfers
A. Whole Sample Regression
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Figure 3.7: Famine Effects on Intergenerational Transfer of Education (1): Highest Edu-
cational Level of Children
A. Whole Sample Regression
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Figure 3.8: Famine Effects on Intergenerational Transfer of Education (2): Lowest Educa-
tional Level of Children
A. Whole Sample Regression
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Figure 3.9: Famine Effects on Intergenerational Transfer of Education (3): Children’s
Educational Level
A. Whole Sample Regression
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Pre-famine group Famine group Post-famine group Total
(1954-1958) (1959-1961) (1962-1965)
Average birth cohort size 435.2 281.7 434.8 399.6
Male 0.498 0.463 0.452 0.473
(0.500) (0.499) (0.498) (0.499)
Number of siblings 4.106 4.366 4.010 4.108
(1.923) (1.779) (1.726) (1.823)
Educational years 4.837 6.331 6.460 5.759
(4.187) (4.340) (3.747) (4.110)
Regular transfer to parents (yuan/year) 43.76 175.1 74.02 77.96
(580.6) (2140.1) (429.7) (981.2)
First job in agricultural sectors 0.914 0.895 0.914 0.911
(0.280) (0.307) (0.280) (0.285)
First job in the same province 0.966 0.962 0.962 0.964
(0.180) (0.191) (0.192) (0.187)
Annual income (thousand yuan) 214.8 226.6 218.7 218.4
(2759.9) (2928.8) (2498.9) (2683.6)
Highest educational level of children 2.218 2.426 2.307 2.295
(1.135) (1.122) (1.067) (1.102)
Lowest educational level of children 1.927 2.047 1.814 1.893
(1.098) (1.085) (1.067) (1.084)
Observations 2176 845 2174 5195
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
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Table 1: (continued)
Health outcomes
Pre-famine control group Famine-treated group Post-famine control group Total
(1954-1958) (1959-1961) (1962-1966)
Height (cm) 159.0 158.9 159.5 159.2
(21.88) (11.56) (9.817) (16.34)
Arthritis 0.362 0.306 0.292 0.324
(0.481) (0.461) (0.455) (0.468)
Asthma 0.0246 0.0155 0.0210 0.0216
(0.155) (0.124) (0.143) (0.145)
Cancer 0.00927 0.0143 0.0103 0.0105
(0.0958) (0.119) (0.101) (0.102)
Cognitive problems 0.325 0.335 0.369 0.345
(0.212) (0.215) (0.226) (0.219)
Diabetes 0.0417 0.0346 0.0285 0.0350
(0.200) (0.183) (0.166) (0.184)
Dyslipidemia 0.0774 0.0727 0.0532 0.0665
(0.267) (0.260) (0.224) (0.249)
Heart disease 0.0955 0.0870 0.0686 0.0829
(0.294) (0.282) (0.253) (0.276)
Hypertension 0.196 0.163 0.135 0.165
(0.397) (0.370) (0.342) (0.371)
Kidney disease 0.0690 0.0656 0.0588 0.0642
(0.254) (0.248) (0.235) (0.245)
Liver disease 0.0459 0.0465 0.0373 0.0424
(0.209) (0.211) (0.190) (0.202)
Lung disease 0.0802 0.0775 0.0658 0.0737
(0.272) (0.268) (0.248) (0.261)
Memory-related disease 0.00788 0.00238 0.00280 0.00486
(0.0884) (0.0488) (0.0529) (0.0696)
Psychiatric problems 0.0158 0.0131 0.00793 0.0121
(0.125) (0.114) (0.0887) (0.109)
Short memory 0.657 0.673 0.702 0.678
(0.338) (0.343) (0.340) (0.340)
Stomach disease 0.240 0.225 0.245 0.240
(0.427) (0.418) (0.430) (0.427)
Stroke 0.0116 0.00954 0.00887 0.0101
(0.107) (0.0972) (0.0938) (0.100)
Observations 2163 843 2152 5158
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
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Table 3.2: Famine Effects on Height
Dependent variable: Height (cm) Whole sample
Subsample
Male Female
(1) (2) (3)
EDR× Birth1954 -0.052 -0.040 -0.076
(0.062) (0.082) (0.055)
EDR × Birth1955 -0.203 -0.069 -0.307
(0.183) (0.091) (0.304)
EDR ×Birth1956 -0.067 -0.070 -0.069
(0.063) (0.082) (0.064)
EDR × Birth1957 -0.117 -0.051 -0.147
(0.059) (0.088) (0.051)
EDR × Birth1958 -0.071 -0.137 -0.002
(0.070) (0.092) (0.066)
EDR × Birth1959 -0.045 -0.050 -0.041
(0.059) (0.082) (0.056)
EDR × Birth1960 0.033 0.033 0.032
(0.071) (0.118) (0.051)
EDR × Birth1961 0.054 0.166 -0.041
(0.089) (0.130) (0.076)
EDR × Birth1962 0.011 0.023 0.003
(0.065) (0.096) (0.055)
EDR × Birth1963 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018
(0.063) (0.093) (0.064)
EDR × Birth1964 -0.022 -0.025 -0.021
(0.067) (0.104) (0.052)
EDR × Birth1965 0.017 0.001 0.027
(0.065) (0.082) (0.067)
EDR × Birth1966 0.009 0.016 0.009
(.) (.) (.)
EDR -0.003 0.007 -0.005
(0.048) (0.070) (0.042)
Gender (Male = 1) 10.569
(0.474)
N 4051 1817 2234
R2 0.111 0.019 0.011
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province-year level
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Famine Effects on Education
Dependent variable: Educational Years Whole sample
Subsample
Male Female
(1) (2) (3)
EDR × Birth1954 -0.013 -0.038 0.016
(0.022) (0.024) (0.029)
EDR × Birth1955 -0.022 -0.017 -0.025
(0.023) (0.032) (0.023)
EDR ×Birth1956 0.001 0.008 -0.014
(0.024) (0.028) (0.030)
EDR × Birth1957 -0.011 0.005 -0.020
(0.024) (0.037) (0.028)
EDR × Birth1958 -0.002 -0.020 0.019
(0.025) (0.029) (0.031)
EDR × Birth1959 -0.011 -0.028 0.003
(0.026) (0.036) (0.030)
EDR × Birth1960 -0.039 -0.050 -0.028
(0.029) (0.037) (0.034)
EDR × Birth1961 -0.020 -0.002 -0.039
(0.023) (0.028) (0.028)
EDR × Birth1962 -0.009 -0.011 -0.009
(0.022) (0.026) (0.026)
EDR × Birth1963 0.002 -0.001 0.003
(0.022) (0.027) (0.023)
EDR × Birth1964 -0.005 0.003 -0.010
(0.027) (0.037) (0.028)
EDR × Birth1965 0.015 0.011 0.018
(0.024) (0.026) (0.028)
EDR × Birth1966 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(.) (.) (.)
EDR -0.022 -0.011 -0.030
(0.018) (0.022) (0.019)
Gender (Male = 1) 3.192
(0.122)
Number of siblings -0.119 -0.033 -0.200
(0.028) (0.040) (0.038)
N 5150 2437 2713
R2 0.209 0.055 0.105
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province-year level
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: Famine Effects on the First Job
Dependent variable:
First Job Agricultural First Job within the Same Province
Whole sample
Subsample
Whole sample
Subsample
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EDR × Birth1954 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0024 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
EDR × Birth1955 0.0002 0.0010 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0017 0.0003
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
EDR ×Birth1956 0.0021 0.0026 0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0017
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
EDR × Birth1957 0.0014 0.0022 0.0010 -0.0008 0.0011 -0.0019
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
EDR × Birth1958 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
EDR × Birth1959 0.0002 0.0011 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0012 -0.0004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
EDR × Birth1960 0.0024 0.0014 0.0032 -0.0021 -0.0006 -0.0031
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EDR × Birth1961 0.0005 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0011 -0.0002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
EDR × Birth1962 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
EDR × Birth1963 -0.0003 -0.0030 0.0015 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
EDR × Birth1964 0.0003 0.0020 -0.0009 0.0008 -0.0005 0.0018
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
EDR × Birth1965 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0010 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0015
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
EDR × Birth1966 -0.0000 0.0013 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
EDR 0.0002 0.0017 -0.0008 0.0006 0.0002 0.0008
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender (Male = 1) -0.0060 0.0165
(0.010) (0.007)
Education -0.0135 -0.0156 -0.0124 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0009
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Agriculture 4582 2086 2496 0.0598 0.0750 0.0409
0.045 0.042 0.050 (0.015) (0.020) (0.021)
N 4582 2086 2496 4582 2086 2496
R2 0.044 0.038 0.047 0.016 0.033 0.015
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province-year level
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Famine Effects on Income
Dependent variable: Annual Income
Whole sample
Subsample
(thousand yuan/year) Male Female
(1) (2) (3)
EDR × Birth1954 6.906 6.035 4.078
(15.142) (19.221) (20.872)
EDR × Birth1955 13.811 16.245 11.468
(16.589) (18.127) (24.091)
EDR ×Birth1956 2.735 9.057 -5.093
(14.471) (17.299) (22.890)
EDR × Birth1957 2.840 2.076 3.964
(13.815) (16.356) (21.192)
EDR × Birth1958 -21.924 -19.461 -24.999
(24.743) (23.620) (31.844)
EDR × Birth1959 -0.928 -5.377 3.974
(14.902) (21.337) (20.922)
EDR × Birth1960 -4.365 -18.826 8.027
(16.829) (25.613) (21.997)
EDR × Birth1961 -0.939 1.998 -3.865
(14.208) (15.050) (22.982)
EDR × Birth1962 -1.848 2.115 -6.445
(15.045) (15.058) (24.885)
EDR × Birth1963 5.683 2.354 8.458
(16.603) (17.015) (24.444)
EDR × Birth1964 7.824 8.890 7.229
(14.297) (16.412) (22.133)
EDR × Birth1965 -0.470 -0.400 -0.080
(13.687) (15.354) (21.252)
EDR × Birth1966 -11.188 -12.958 -9.163
(.) (.) (.)
EDR -13.882 -15.244 -12.617
(13.498) (15.098) (21.016)
Gender (Male = 1) -50.454
(85.712)
Education 9.388 2.282 11.097
(16.198) (17.022) (22.290)
Experience 27.585 17.447 25.469
(15.994) (17.501) (22.179)
Experience squared -0.472 -0.232 -0.502
(0.280) (0.375) (0.382)
N 4886 2325 2561
R2 0.003 0.006 0.007
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province-year level
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: Famine Effects on Family Transfers
Dependent variable: Regular Transfer
Whole sample
Subsample
to Parents (yuan/year) Male Female
(1) (2) (3)
EDR × Birth1954 7.288 13.343 -1.775
(4.142) (5.410) (1.828)
EDR × Birth1955 -5.326 -11.973 0.647
(2.563) (5.485) (2.806)
EDR ×Birth1956 -2.933 -4.492 -0.743
(2.267) (5.468) (1.591)
EDR × Birth1957 -13.346 -37.721 -0.821
(10.674) (32.111) (1.718)
EDR × Birth1958 -3.823 -10.185 -1.797
(2.341) (3.455) (2.141)
EDR × Birth1959 -9.713 -21.344 -1.709
(3.376) (10.127) (1.742)
EDR × Birth1960 -18.037 -37.288 -1.193
(14.309) (41.383) (1.625)
EDR × Birth1961 -6.892 -14.696 -0.950
(4.540) (9.829) (1.658)
EDR × Birth1962 -2.730 -8.712 0.697
(2.035) (3.454) (1.769)
EDR × Birth1963 0.801 6.113 -0.876
(2.101) (8.165) (2.412)
EDR × Birth1964 -1.374 -4.593 1.599
(2.215) (4.516) (1.896)
EDR × Birth1965 6.438 14.882 -0.954
(5.830) (11.428) (1.962)
EDR × Birth1966 -3.135 -7.690 -0.466
(.) (.) (.)
EDR 1.045 0.509 0.477
(1.688) (1.914) (1.586)
Gender (Male = 1) 255.184
(128.448)
Education -10.473 -30.025 1.631
(16.215) (44.889) (2.025)
Annual income 0.001 -0.025 0.008
(0.007) (0.020) (0.010)
Number of siblings alive 29.871 45.218 6.325
(31.804) (60.146) (4.791)
N 1392 606 786
R2 0.022 0.041 0.018
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province-year level
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: Famine Effects on Children’s Education: Bounds of Educational Levels
Dependent variable:
Highest Educational Level of Children Lowest Educational Level of Children
Whole sample
Subsample
Whole sample
Subsample
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EDR × Birth1954 0.005 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.010
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
EDR × Birth1955 -0.012 -0.008 -0.018 -0.008 0.001 -0.018
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
EDR ×Birth1956 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.018
(0.009) (0.006) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017)
EDR × Birth1957 -0.006 -0.022 0.004 0.002 -0.019 0.012
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008)
EDR × Birth1958 -0.012 -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 -0.005 -0.026
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
EDR × Birth1959 0.008 0.014 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) (0.017) (0.009)
EDR × Birth1960 0.007 0.018 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.002
(0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013)
EDR × Birth1961 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.004 -0.005 0.012
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
EDR × Birth1962 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007)
EDR × Birth1963 0.007 -0.000 0.011 0.004 -0.004 0.008
(0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007)
EDR × Birth1964 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.011 -0.005 -0.015
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008)
EDR × Birth1965 -0.003 0.007 -0.010 0.007 0.019 0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
EDR × Birth1966 -0.002 -0.007 0.002 0.006 -0.006 0.011
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
EDR -0.008 -0.012 -0.006 -0.002 -0.014 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Gender (Male = 1) -0.415 -0.390
(0.055) (0.060)
Education 0.087 0.104 0.076 0.093 0.104 0.085
(0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009)
N 1924 864 1060 1671 726 945
R2 0.117 0.139 0.115 0.133 0.170 0.140
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province-year level
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Famine Effects on Children’s Education: Individual Educational Attainment
Dependent variable: Children’s Educational Level Whole sample
Subsample
Male Female
(1) (2) (3)
EDR × Birth1954 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
EDR × Birth1955 -0.011 -0.006 -0.018
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
EDR ×Birth1956 0.021 0.023 0.017
(0.009) (0.006) (0.015)
EDR × Birth1957 -0.000 -0.020 0.011
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
EDR × Birth1958 -0.010 -0.005 -0.020
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
EDR × Birth1959 0.007 0.014 0.004
(0.009) (0.015) (0.010)
EDR × Birth1960 0.007 0.018 -0.003
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
EDR × Birth1961 0.008 0.004 0.012
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
EDR × Birth1962 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
EDR × Birth1963 0.006 0.001 0.009
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007)
EDR × Birth1964 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007)
EDR × Birth1965 -0.003 0.006 -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
EDR × Birth1966 0.003 -0.004 0.008
(.) (.) (.)
EDR -0.005 -0.010 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Parental gender (Male = 1) -0.445
(0.051)
Parental education 0.082 0.097 0.069
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
Gender of child (Male = 1) -0.165 -0.054 -0.266
(0.044) (0.066) (0.056)
Number of siblings -0.075 -0.087 -0.056
(0.032) (0.040) (0.046)
N 2966 1356 1610
R2 0.121 0.138 0.124
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province-year level
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix
3.A Cohort Size and EDR
Figure 3.10: Decrease Rate of Average Cohort Size and EDR
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3.B Famine Effects on Health Outcomes
Figure 3.11: Famine Effects on Health Outcomes
Dependent variables: binary variables indicating suffering from a certain disease or health problem
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3.C Famine Effects on Top of the Distribution
Figure 3.12: Famine Effects on People in Top of the Distributions
A. Effects on Height and Education
-
.
6
-
.
4
-
.
2
0
.
2
1955 1960 1965
Birth year
Dependent variable: attained height (cm)
Coefficients of Birth_year*Excess_death_rate (Top Quantiles)
-
.
06
-
.
04
-
.
02
0
.
02
.
04
1955 1960 1965
Birth year
Dependent variable: educational years
Coefficients of Birth_year*Excess_death_rate (Top Quantiles)
B. Effects on Labor Market Outcomes
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Figure 3.13: Famine Effects on People in Top of the Distributions (continued)
C. Effects on Transfers to Parents
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D. Effects on Children’s Education
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3.D Unconditional Effects
Figure 3.14: Unconditional Famine Effects
A. Unconditional Effects on Labor Market Outcomes
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Figure 3.15: Unconditional Famine Effects (continued)
C. Unconditional Effects on Transfers to Parents
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3.E Population Changes
Table 3.9: Population Natural Change over 1956-1964 in China
Year Birth Rate (%) Death Rate (%)
1954 3.80 13.2
1955 3.26 12.3
1956 3.19 1.14
1957 3.40 1.08
1958 2.92 1.20
1959 2.48 1.46
1960 2.09 2.54
1961 1.80 1.42
1962 3.70 1.00
1963 4.34 1.00
1964 3.91 1.15
1965 3.79 0.95
1966 3.51 0.88
Source: China Population Statistical Yearbooks
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Table 3.10: Death Rates (DR) of Provinces Sampled
Province Average 1956-58 DR 1959 DR 1960 DR 1961 Average 1962-64 EDR
Anhui 11.89 16.71 68.58 8.1 8.34 56.68
Beijing 8.07 9.57 9.22 10.81 8.27 1.13
Chongqing 12.78 31.52 44.93 26.48 13.56 32.13
Fujian 8.31 7.94 15.6 12.18 8.15 7.28
Gansu 14.4 17.37 41.31 11.47 11.39 26.9
Guangdong 9.59 11.76 15.09 10.67 8.42 5.5
Guangxi 12.28 17.32 29.2 20.37 10.35 16.9
Guizhou 13.53 20.28 52.33 23.27 16.47 38.79
Hebei 11.26 12.31 12.18 13.34 10.03 0.93
Heilongjiang 9.89 12.76 10.52 11.11 9.55 0.62
Henan 12.82 14.1 39.56 10.19 9.35 26.72
Hubei 10.01 14.48 21.21 9.07 9.85 11.21
Hunan 11.14 12.92 29.26 17.47 11.11 18.12
Inner Mongolia 9.06 12.27 9.69 9.32 10.17 0.62
Jiangsu 10.72 14.55 18.4 13.35 9.84 7.67
Jiangxi 11.76 13.01 16.05 11.53 10.53 4.3
Jilin 8.56 13.43 10.13 12.03 10.67 1.55
Liaoning 8.27 11.77 11.5 17.5 8.59 3.23
Ningxia 11.9 15.81 13.88 10.71 10.72 1.97
Qinghai 10.78 16.29 40.72 11.68 9.75 29.94
Shaanxi 10.39 12.76 12.27 8.76 11.82 1.87
Shandong 12.32 18.13 23.51 18.48 12.06 11.18
Shanghai 6.28 7.8 6.9 7.69 6.78 0.61
Shanxi 12.0 12.84 14.21 12.19 12.25 2.21
Sichuan 13.65 19.21 47.77 28.01 13.77 34.11
Tianjin 7.32 9.27 7.46 8.1 6.51 0.14
Xinjiang 13.72 18.84 15.67 11.71 11.82 1.94
Yunnan 17.7 17.95 26.26 11.84 13.4 8.55
Zhejiang 9.31 10.81 11.88 9.82 8.56 2.56
Average 11.02 14.61 23.29 13.35 10.42 12.25
Source: China Population Statistical Yearbooks, China Provincial Statistical Yearbooks
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3.F Cohort Size of the Sample
Table 3.11: Cohort Size by Urban/Rural Areas
Birth cohorts
Urban Rural Total
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
1954 259 8.64 480 9.24 739 9.02
1955 240 8.01 469 9.03 709 8.65
1956 230 7.67 437 8.41 667 8.14
1957 241 8.04 435 8.37 676 8.25
1958 213 7.10 355 6.83 568 6.93
1959 166 5.54 280 5.39 446 5.44
1960 181 6.04 306 5.89 487 5.94
1961 149 4.97 259 4.99 408 4.98
1962 306 10.21 475 9.14 781 9.53
1963 317 10.57 571 10.99 888 10.84
1964 271 9.04 439 8.45 710 8.67
1965 260 8.67 446 8.59 706 8.62
1966 165 5.50 243 4.68 408 4.98
Total 2998 100.00 5195 100.00 8193 100.00
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Table 3.12: Cohort Size by Gender in Rural Areas
Birth cohort
Female Male Total
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
1954 241 8.87 236 9.67 477 9.25
1955 248 9.13 218 8.93 466 9.03
1956 211 7.77 225 9.22 436 8.45
1957 229 8.43 204 8.36 433 8.39
1958 156 5.74 195 7.99 351 6.80
1959 154 5.67 125 5.12 279 5.41
1960 155 5.70 150 6.15 305 5.91
1961 144 5.30 115 4.71 259 5.02
1962 251 9.24 221 9.05 472 9.15
1963 300 11.04 263 10.77 563 10.92
1964 242 8.91 190 7.78 432 8.38
1965 239 8.80 205 8.40 444 8.61
1966 147 5.41 94 3.85 241 4.67
Total 2717 100.00 2441 100.00 5158 100.00
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3.G Famine Effects by Birth Period
Table 3.13: Famine Effects by Birth Period
Dependent variable
Pre-famine During famine
(1954-1958) (1959-1961)
Height -0.0773∗∗ 0.0388
(0.0353) (0.0278)
Education -0.00894 -0.0185∗
(0.00851) (0.0110)
Labor market outcomes
First job agricultural 0.000599 0.000762
(0.000516) (0.000665)
First job within province -0.000275 -0.000573
(0.000360) (0.000534)
Annual income -0.00574 -3.811
(4.867) (4.800)
Transfers to parents -2.935∗ -6.856∗∗
(1.697) (3.390)
Children’s education
Highest level 0.000608 0.00809∗∗
(0.00460) (0.00409)
Lowest level 0.00388 0.00492
(0.00499) (0.00429)
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province-year level
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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